Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity

Uchida S & Sasaki T (2013). Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity. Chaos, Solitons & Fractals DOI:10.1016/j.chaos.2013.08.006.

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Abstract

Stern-judging is one of the best-known assessment rules in indirect reciprocity. Indirect reciprocity is a fundamental mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. It relies on mutual monitoring and assessment, i.e., individuals judge, following their own assessment rules, whether other individuals are "good" or "bad" according to information on their past behaviors. Among many assessment rules, stern-judging is known to provide stable cooperation in a population, as observed when all members in the population know all about other's behaviors (public information case) and when the members never commit an assessment error. In this paper, the effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging is investigated. By analyzing the image matrix, which describes who is good in the eyes of whom in the population, we analytically show that private information and assessment error cause the collapse of stern-judging: All individuals assess other individuals as "good" at random with a probability of 1/2.

Item Type: Article
Research Programs: Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
Bibliographic Reference: Chaos, Solitons & Fractals; 56:175-180 (November 2013)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 08:48
Last Modified: 25 Feb 2016 11:15
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/10349

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