Power, prices, and incomes in voting systems

Young HP (1978). Power, prices, and incomes in voting systems. Mathematical Programming 14 (1): 129-148. DOI:10.1007/BF01588961.

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Abstract

The power of voters in a voting game (simple game) is viewed as the amount they would be paid by a lobbyist buying their votes. Equilibrium prices for the voters are shown to exist whenever there is no veto player, and the expected incomes of the voters are compared with other measures of their voting power.

Item Type: Article
Research Programs: System and Decision Sciences - Core (SDS)
Depositing User: Romeo Molina
Date Deposited: 14 Apr 2016 09:45
Last Modified: 14 Apr 2016 09:45
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/12689

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