Exploitable Surplus in N-Person Games

Young HP (1979). Exploitable Surplus in N-Person Games. In: Applied Game Theory. Eds. Brams, S.J., Schotter, A. & Schwödiauer, G., pp. 32-38 Germany: Physica-Verlag HD. ISBN 978-3-662-41501-6 DOI:10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2.

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Abstract

Any cooperative n-person game with transferable utility has a noncooperative mode in which the players sell out of their positions to an external market of entrepreneurial organizing agents. Assuming a market of price takers, this game of competitive self-valuation always has an equilibrium price solution. Every core imputation in the original game constitutes a set of equilibrium prices. If there is no core the entrepreneurs can exploit the coalitions for a profit, i.e., they realize a positive rent for their organizing function. Application is made to determining fair wages to labor, and finding equilibrium prices for legislators selling their votes.

Item Type: Book Section
Depositing User: Romeo Molina
Date Deposited: 01 Dec 2016 10:29
Last Modified: 01 Dec 2016 10:29
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/14042

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