Social Justice and Individual Choice

Young HP (1994). Social Justice and Individual Choice. IIASA Working Paper. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: WP-94-025

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Abstract

Consider a divisible resource or cost that is to be fairly distributed among a group, and suppose that various members of the group have different opinions about what a fair distribution might be. We exhibit a class of mechanisms that aggregate individual opinions into a group opinion, and which have the property that no one can manipulate the size of his own share. There is a unique such mechanism that satisfies a variant of Arrow's conditions for social choice functions. We illustrate its application to distributing dues among the member countries of IIASA. Other potential applications include distributing shares in formerly state-owned enterprises, and in allocating voting power among different states or regions in a federal system of government.

Item Type: Monograph (IIASA Working Paper)
Research Programs: Institute Scholars (INS)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 02:04
Last Modified: 04 Aug 2016 12:33
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/4184

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