Optimal allocation of drug control efforts: A differential game analysis

Feichtinger G & Dawid H (1996). Optimal allocation of drug control efforts: A differential game analysis. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 91 (3): 279-297. DOI:10.1007/BF02190097.

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

The present paper considers a dynamic nonzero-sum game between drug dealers and the authorities. Although the game is neither linear-quadratic nor degenerate, in the sense that the closed-loop equilibria coincide with the open-loop equilibria, we are able to calculate explicitly a stationary feedback Nash equilibrium of that game. In a numerical example, we determine the optimal allocation of governmental efforts between treatment and law enforcement minimizing the total discounted cost stream in the equilibrium. Moreover, we provide sensitivity analyses with respect to the efficiency parameters of both competitors. Our results show that a farsighted authority should attack the drug problem from the demand side and put much effort in treatment measures and the improvement of the efficiency of the treatment.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Differential games; Drug control; Feedback Nash equilibria; Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations
Research Programs: World Population (POP)
Bibliographic Reference: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications; 91(3):279-297 (November 1996)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 02:06
Last Modified: 24 Feb 2016 14:59
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/4632

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
Schlossplatz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
Phone: (+43 2236) 807 0 Fax:(+43 2236) 71 313