Games evolution plays

Sigmund K (1997). Games evolution plays. In: New Aspects of Human Ethology. Eds. Schmitt, A., New York: Plenum Press. ISBN 0-306-456-958 DOI:10.1007/978-0-585-34289-4_4.

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Abstract

The evolution of cooperation is frequently analysed in terms of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. Computer simulations show that the emergence of cooperation is a robust phenomenon. However, the strategy which eventually gets adopted in the population seems to depend sensitively on fine details of the modelling process, so that it becomes difficult to predict the evolutionary outcome in real populations.

Item Type: Book Section
Research Programs: Adaptive Dynamics Network (ADN)
Bibliographic Reference: In: A. Schmitt et al. (ed.); New Aspects of Human Ethology; Plenum Press, New York, NY, USA, pp.65-76 (1997)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 02:08
Last Modified: 20 Jan 2016 16:41
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/5143

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