Rational Inefficient Compromises in Negotiation

Kersten GE & Mallory GR (1998). Rational Inefficient Compromises in Negotiation. IIASA Interim Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-98-024

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Abstract

It has often been assumed that rational negotiators who achieve inefficient compromises should accept Pareto improvements suggested by some external party, such as an expert mediator, or a computer system. Following this assumption an argument is made to give legitimacy to efficient compromises generated by a negotiation support system or to entice a partymove to a Pareto improvement. The simplificatons made in model construction on the one hand and the very narrow and limited considerations of rationality in present negotiation support systems on the other, suggest a different approach to support. This approach is based on engaging users to a sound process confronting them with their inconsisencies rather than providing solutions or promoting improvements.

Item Type: Monograph (IIASA Interim Report)
Research Programs: Decision Analysis and Support (DAS)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 02:10
Last Modified: 18 Nov 2016 18:35
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/5624

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