Incentives and opportunism: From the carrot to the stick

Hilbe C & Sigmund K (2010). Incentives and opportunism: From the carrot to the stick. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 277 (1693): 2427-2433. DOI:10.1098/rspb.2010.0065.

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

Cooperation in public good games is greatly promoted by positive and negative incentives. In this papr, we use evolutionary game dynamics to study the evolution of opportunism (the readiness to be swayed by incentives) and the evolution of trst (the propensity to cooperate in the absence of information on the co-players). If both positive and negative incentives are available, evlution leads to a population where defectors are punished and players cooperate, except when they can get away with defection. Rewarding behaviourdoes not become fixed, but can play an essential role in catalysing the emergence of cooperation, especially if the information level is low.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Punishment; Reputation; Reward
Research Programs: Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
Bibliographic Reference: Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences; 277(1693):2427-2433 (22 August 2010) (Published online 07 April 2010)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 08:43
Last Modified: 23 Aug 2016 09:37
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/9197

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
Schlossplatz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
Phone: (+43 2236) 807 0 Fax:(+43 2236) 71 313