Impact of generalized benefit functions on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with continuous strategies

Chen X, Szolnoki A, Perc M, & Wang L (2012). Impact of generalized benefit functions on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with continuous strategies. Physical Review E 85 (6) DOI:10.1103/PhysRevE.85.066133.

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Abstract

Cooperation and defection may be considered to be two extreme responses to a social dilemma. Yet the reality is much less clear-cut. Between the two extremes lies an interval of ambivalent choices, which may be captured theoretically by means of continuous strategies defining the extent of the contributions of each individual player to the common pool. If strategies are chosen from the unit interval, where 0 corresponds to pure defection and 1 corresponds to the maximal contribution, the question is what is the characteristic level of individual investments to the benefit functions, and we show that in a structured population there exist intermediate values of both at which the collective contributions are maximal. However, as the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation increases, the characteristic threshold decreases while the corresponding steepness increases. Our observations remain valid if more complex sigmoid functions are used, thus reenforcing the importance of carefully adjusted benefits for high levels of public cooperation.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Benefit functions; Evolution of cooperation; Extreme response; Public goods games; Sigmoid function; Social dilemmas; Structured population; Two parameter; Unit intervals
Research Programs: Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
Postdoctoral Scholars (PDS)
Bibliographic Reference: Physical Review E; 85(6):066133 (June 2012)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 08:46
Last Modified: 29 Feb 2016 12:55
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/9898

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