Win-stay-lose-learn promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Liu Y, Chen X, Zhang L, Wang L, & Perc M (2012). Win-stay-lose-learn promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. PLoS ONE 7 (2): e30689. DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0030689.

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Abstract

Holding on to one's strategy is natural and common if the latter warrants success and satisfaction. This goes against widespread simulation practices of evolutionary games, where players frequently consider changing their strategy even though their payoffs may be marginally different than those of the other players. Inspired by this observation, we introduce an aspiration-based win-stay-lose-learn strategy updating rule into the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. The rule is simple and intuitive, foreseeing strategy changes only by dissatisfied players, who then attempt to adopt the strategy of one of their nearest neighbors, while the strategies of satisfied players are not subject to change. We find that the proposed win-stay-lose-learn rule promotes the evolution of cooperation, and it does so very robustly and independently of the initial conditions. In fact, we show that even a minute initial fraction of cooperators may be sufficient to eventually secure a highly cooperative final state. In addition to extensive simulation results that support our conclusions, we also present results obtained by means of the pair approximation of the studied game. Our findings continue the success story of related win-stay strategy updating rules, and by doing so reveal new ways of resolving the prisoner's dilemma.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Controlled study; Cooperation; Game; Reward; Satisfaction; Simulation; Social behavior; Social evolution; Spatial prisoner's dilemma game; Win-stay-lose-learn strategy
Research Programs: Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
Postdoctoral Scholars (PDS)
Bibliographic Reference: PLoS ONE; 7(2):e30689 (17 February 2012)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 08:46
Last Modified: 09 May 2016 14:19
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/9982

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