Social evolution leads to persistent corruption

Lee J-H, Iwasa Y, Dieckmann U ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7089-0393, & Sigmund K (2019). Social evolution leads to persistent corruption. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences DOI:10.1073/pnas.1900078116. (In Press)

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Abstract

Cooperation can be sustained by institutions that punish free-riders. Such institutions, however, tend to be subverted by corruption if they are not closely watched. Monitoring can uphold the enforcement of binding agreements ensuring cooperation, but this usually comes at a price. The temptation to skip monitoring and take the institution’s integrity for granted leads to outbreaks of corruption and the breakdown of cooperation. We model the corresponding mechanism by means of evolutionary game theory, using analytical methods and numerical simulations, and find that it leads to sustained or damped oscillations. The results confirm the view that corruption is endemic and transparency a major factor in reducing it.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: cooperation; corruption; evolutionary game theory; social contract; punishment
Research Programs: Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
Depositing User: Michaela Rossini
Date Deposited: 14 Jun 2019 06:28
Last Modified: 17 Jun 2019 06:19
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/15945

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