

1 Title:

2 Ecological, angler and spatial heterogeneity drive social and ecological outcomes in an  
3 integrated landscape model of freshwater recreational fisheries

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26 Abstract

27 Freshwater recreational fisheries constitute complex adaptive social-ecological systems (SES)  
28 where mobile anglers link spatially structured ecosystems. We present a general  
29 social-ecological model of a spatial recreational fishery for northern pike (*Esox lucius*) that  
30 included an empirically measured mechanistic utility model driving angler behaviors. We  
31 studied emergent properties at the macro-scale (e.g., region) as a result of local-scale  
32 fish-angler interactions, while systematically examining key heterogeneities (at the angler and  
33 ecosystem level) and sources of uncertainty. We offer three key insights. First, the angler  
34 population size and the resulting latent regional angling effort exerts a much greater impact on  
35 the overall regional-level overfishing outcome than any residential pattern (urban or rural),  
36 while the residential patterns strongly affects the location of local overfishing pockets. Second,  
37 simplifying a heterogeneous angler population to a homogenous one representing the  
38 preference and behaviours of an average angler risks severely underestimating  
39 landscape-level effort and regional overfishing. Third, we did not find that ecologically more  
40 productive lakes were more systematically overexploited than lower-productive lakes. We  
41 conclude that understanding regional-level outcomes depends on considering four key  
42 ingredients: regional angler population size, the angler population composition, the specific  
43 residential pattern in place and spatial ecological variation. Simplification of any of these may  
44 obscure important dynamics and render the system prone to collapse.

45 **Keywords:** anglers, bio-economics, choice model, cross-scale interactions, harvest  
46 regulations, non-linear feedbacks, multi-attribute utility

## 47 Introduction

48 Recreational fishers are the dominant users of wild living fish stocks in most inland fisheries  
49 and many coastal ones in the industrialized world (Arlinghaus et al., 2015). Recreational  
50 fisheries constitute complex adaptive social-ecological systems (SESs) (Hunt et al., 2013;  
51 Ziegler et al., 2017), which are characterized by three key features (Arlinghaus et al., 2017):  
52 individual and spatial heterogeneity, hierarchical organization across scales (from micro to  
53 macro levels) and the presence of non-linearities leading to the potential for regime shifts.  
54 Outcomes in complex adaptive SESs at macro-scales (e.g., regionally, nationally or globally)  
55 are an emergent, self-organized property of local-level interactions among humans and  
56 ecosystems (Levin et al., 2013). For example, in open-access freshwater recreational fisheries  
57 local, micro-level interactions of anglers and selected lakes or river sections give rise to a  
58 spatial spread of angling effort on the macro-level as anglers select sites that promise high  
59 utility. Alternatively framed, the dynamic site choice behaviour of anglers at equilibrium  
60 produces regional-level outcomes at the macro-scale, such as degree of overfishing, spread of  
61 non-natives fishes and social well-being or conflict (Arlinghaus et al., 2017). If we are to  
62 advance our understanding of recreational fisheries as complex adaptive SESs, a focus on the  
63 macro-scale outcomes and how they mechanistically result (i.e., emerge) from a range of  
64 micro-scale feedbacks among anglers and fish stocks/ecosystems is needed (Arlinghaus et al.,  
65 2017). This is particularly the case in freshwater recreational fisheries where there is an

66 exceedingly large individual (i.e., angler-level) and spatial heterogeneity (i.e., among lake  
67 variation in ecological quality) and where cross-scale feedbacks among social and  
68 environmental subsystems are commonly observed (Arlinghaus et al., 2017; Mee et al., 2016;  
69 Wilson et al., 2016; Ziegler et al., 2017).

70           One characteristic, yet managerially largely overlooked feature of most freshwater  
71 recreational fisheries is their spatial structure, both in terms of spatial variation in productivity  
72 of different ecosystems (Kaufmann et al., 2009; Lester et al., 2003; Post et al., 2008; Shuter et  
73 al., 1998) as well as spatial variation in residential patterns of the human forager in terms of  
74 where anglers live relative to the available resource patches (lakes, river section) they seek.  
75 Broadly speaking, a water-rich freshwater fisheries landscape can be exploited by human  
76 foragers living a small number of large metropolitan areas (e.g., Post et al., 2008) or human  
77 foragers may reside in rural contexts in a multitude of individual villages and towns spread in  
78 the landscape. The residential structure affects travel costs, which is a key component of  
79 angler utility and hence site choice (Hunt 2005; Post et al., 2008). Therefore, the fishing  
80 pressure on any given locality will be a function of where the forager population is  
81 geographically located relative to the locality, but no systematic research is available on this  
82 topic.

83           Overall, few studies on the landscape dynamics of freshwater recreational fisheries  
84 exist, most of which are from North America (Askey et al., 2013; Carpenter & Brock, 2004;

85 Hunt et al., 2011; de Kerkhove et al., 2015; Mee et al., 2016; Post & Parkinson, 2012; Post et  
86 al., 2008; Shuter et al., 1998; Wilson et al., 2016; Ziegler et al., 2017). Most of these studies  
87 were focused on how overfishing and other regional outcomes related to an urban residential  
88 pattern of the human forager population (e.g., Carpenter & Brock, 2004; Hunt et al., 2011;  
89 Post et al., 2008), modelled one specific landscape characterized by a unique management  
90 approach (e.g., stocking-based rainbow trout, *Oncorhynchus mykiss*, fishery in British  
91 Columbia near Vancouver, Post et al., 2008) and omitted addressing systematic effects of  
92 heterogeneity within the forager (angler) population by focusing on angling effort as an  
93 aggregate outcome (Camp et al., 2015; Post et al., 2008). This is a relevant shortcoming  
94 because angler diversity in preferences and behaviour is likely to strongly affect feedbacks  
95 among social and ecological subsystems (Johnston et al., 2010) and thereby dictate  
96 regional-level outcomes (e.g., where overfished stocks are expected to happen, Hunt et al.,  
97 2011).

98         To further our understanding about which outcomes to expect from the localized  
99 interaction of fish and anglers at the landscape scale, the construction of process-based  
100 simulation models carrying sufficient mechanistic detail about the main driving mechanisms  
101 (e.g., compensatory reserve of fishes varying in productivity across lakes or site choice  
102 process exhibited by heterogeneous anglers) is needed (Fenichel et al., 2013a; Schlüter et al.,  
103 2012). Process-based modelling approaches seem warranted because the complex adaptive

104 system of recreational fisheries is characterized by many non-linear feedbacks whose joint  
105 effects are difficult to be predicted beyond the sphere of observed parameters in  
106 correlation-based models (Arlinghaus et al., 2017; Fenichel et al., 2013a; Hunt et al., 2011;  
107 Schlüter et al., 2012;). One key ingredient to include in models of the SES of recreational  
108 fisheries is a mechanistic model of angler behaviour (Abbott & Fenichel, 2013; Allen et al.,  
109 2013; Fenichel et al., 2013a; Johnston et al., 2015). Explicitly representing the mechanisms of  
110 site choice by anglers and how site-choice behaviour is affected by both catch and non-catch  
111 related experience preferences can lead to strongly differing predictions about the distribution  
112 of foragers and ultimately regional-level outcomes compared to models where the behaviour  
113 of anglers is simplified to those determinants that would drive natural foragers, e.g., expected  
114 catch rates (Hunt et al., 2011; Johnston et al., 2010; Matsumura et al., 2010).

115         We aimed at studying regional-level overfishing patterns and social outcomes in a  
116 rich class of recreational fisheries landscapes that varied in the geographical distribution of  
117 the human forager population, using a general social-ecological model that involved an  
118 empirically estimated mechanistic model of site choice of anglers, while accounting for  
119 ecological variation among lakes and angler heterogeneity in preferences and behaviour. We  
120 wanted to go beyond existing landscape investigations that were usually tailored towards one  
121 specific residential pattern and geography and thereby provide general insights into which  
122 spatial patterns of effort, yield, angler well-being and overfishing to expect in varying



123 residential scenarios, for varying angler population sizes and for anglers and lakes varying in  
124 key features (preferences or productivities, respectively). We sought answers to three key  
125 questions:

126 1. Which systematic impact on regional-level outcomes in an open-access freshwater  
127 recreational fishery can be expected from variation in residential patterns of the human  
128 forager population ranging from urban to rural?

129 2. Which systematic effects on regional-level outcomes can be expected to arise from  
130 heterogeneity in angler preferences and behaviour?

131 3. Which systematic effects on regional-level outcomes can be expected to arise from  
132 among-lake ecological heterogeneity in productivity and carrying capacity?

133 Related to these three objectives, we hypothesized (H1) that a rural residential pattern will  
134 even out landscape-level overfishing and render the placement of overfished stocks less  
135 concentrated around urbanities (the latter was usually reported from urban fisheries  
136 landscapes, Hunt et al., 2011; Post et al., 2008), (H2) that angler heterogeneity will aggravate  
137 regional overfishing by spreading effort in space to also remote fisheries (Ward et al., 2013b),  
138 and (H3) that we will continue to find little evidence for more productive fisheries being  
139 systematically overexploited by anglers that follow a multi-dimensional utility function when  
140 searching for fishing sites in space (Hunt et al., 2011).

141 The rationale for the third and last hypothesis is that anglers are known to choose

142 lakes following a multi-dimensional utility function where various non-catch dimensions of  
143 the angling experience (e.g., social aspects, distance, costs, harvest regulations) affect the  
144 expected utility of a site or ecosystem to anglers in addition to those dimensions that are  
145 strongly about catch expectations (e.g., catch rate, size of the fish that are captured)  
146 (Arlinghaus et al., 2014; Cole & Ward, 1994; Hunt 2005; Johnson & Carpenter, 1994;  
147 McFadden, 1973). Moreover, anglers are known to be highly heterogeneous in their  
148 preferences and behaviours (Anderson, 1993; Beardmore et al., 2011; Cole & Ward, 1994;  
149 Dorow et al., 2010; Fenichel & Abott, 2014; Johnston et al., 2010; Wilde & Ditton, 1994),  
150 which will strongly affect where in space a particular angler type will be attracted to (Hunt et  
151 al., 2011; Ward et al., 2013a, b). If anglers, however, would be mainly attracted to a given  
152 fishery by the expected catch rates with only minor importance attached to other attributes of  
153 the lake and the fishing experience in general (e.g., distance, crowding), the classic ideal free  
154 distribution framework (Fretwell & Lucas 1970) from behavioural ecology would allow the  
155 clear-cut prediction that lakes offering higher catch rates (i.e., more productive fisheries)  
156 should be systematically overexploited (Parkinson et al., 2004). Our own previous work,  
157 however, has revealed that such expectations are not warranted (Hunt et al., 2011). Instead,  
158 deviations from a catch-based ideal free distribution (where at equilibrium all lakes  
159 supposedly offer a regional average catch quality, Mee et al., 2016) should be the norm 1)  
160 when angler's site choice is sub-optimal (by choosing the lake with the highest expected

161 utility probabilistically rather than deterministically), and 2) when multiple attributes in  
162 addition to catch affect site choice. Both dimensions – suboptimal lake choice and multiple  
163 non-catch attributes providing utility – should foster a dynamic equilibrium that maintains  
164 between-lake variation in catch rates and other measures of catch qualities (Hunt et al., 2011;  
165 Matsumura et al., 2010), but this predictions remains to be fully explored in the present paper.

166 We designed our work to provide a comprehensive examination of the systematic  
167 impacts of spatial and angler heterogeneity assuming a mechanistic model of angler behaviour  
168 following utility theory. Our research is meant to constitute a strategic modelling experiment  
169 (as opposed to a tactical modelling approach that looks for insights in relation to a very  
170 specific fisheries landscape) about social and ecological regional-level outcomes to be  
171 expected when anglers interact in a localized fashion with spatially structured lakes. The  
172 behavioural model of angler site choice we use was informed by empirical data from stated  
173 behaviour of anglers in Germany (Beardmore et al., 2013), and the fish biological component  
174 was calibrated to empirical data of the northern pike (*Esox lucius*). We assume anglers are  
175 human foragers, who seek fitness in utility units. We choose pike as the target species due to  
176 its circumpolar distribution in most lakes of North America and Eurasia and because pike is a  
177 heavy sought species by many anglers across its native range (Arlinghaus & Mehner, 2005;  
178 Crane et al., 2015). Despite this calibration, our model provides generic insights into  
179 outcomes to be expected from individual and spatial heterogeneity in a coupled SES of

180 recreational fisheries. Results of our work are to be seen as hypotheses to be explored in  
181 specific fisheries and as explanation for empirical findings reported elsewhere (e.g., Mee et al.,  
182 2016). We hope to provide an innovation over existing SES models of recreational fisheries  
183 by presenting several outcomes jointly, related to regional-level ecological objectives (e.g.,  
184 regional overfishing), regional-level economic objectives (e.g., regional angler welfare) and  
185 more traditional fisheries objectives (e.g., average catch rates and effort distribution). Thereby,  
186 our work contributes to the importance of being explicit about management objectives in  
187 assessing regional-level outcomes of fish-angler interactions (Fenichel et al., 2013b). Finally,  
188 our work also offers some strategic management implications into expected ways how  
189 traditional management tools designed to affect either people (through harvest regulations) or  
190 fish stocks (through activities such as habitat enhancement or stocking) may play out when  
191 anglers and fish stocks thriving in spatially and ecologically varying ecosystems are linked  
192 through site choice behaviour of a heterogeneous angler population in freshwater landscapes.

193

194 The model

195 Spatial structure

196 We designed a freshwater fisheries landscape *in silico*, constructing a two-dimensional square  
197 lattice of  $11 \times 11$  (=121) lakes, each of a small size of 10 ha. The size was chosen so that  
198 angler crowding would be present at high-use fisheries, which reduces attractiveness of a lake  
199 (Arlinghaus et al., 2014; Hunt 2005). The distance to a closest neighbouring lake was

200 assumed to be 15 km. We present two extreme residential patterns - uniform (“Rural”) and  
201 concentrated (“Urban”). In the rural case, anglers were assumed to live in towns (of identical  
202 population sizes) adjacent to lakes across the landscape. In the concentrated urban case, all the  
203 anglers were assumed to live in a large city located nearby the central lake of the lattice. We  
204 also examined intermediate cases as larger cities (harbouring anglers) scattered through the  
205 landscape. As these intermediate cases were found to be always intermediate to the rural and  
206 the urban cases, we decided to not present the data in this paper to simplify the presentation.  
207 Following the pioneering landscape studies of Carpenter and Brock (2004) and Hunt et al.  
208 (2011) and arguments expressed elsewhere (Fenichel et al., 2013a; Johnston et al., 2010),  
209 anglers were assumed to move between spatially segregated and ecologically independent  
210 lakes according to the (multidimensional) utility each lake provides (for details, see further  
211 below). In behavioural ecological terms, the human forager was assumed to select a lake  
212 according to the “fitness” offered by a patch (lake) (as assumed in the ideal free distribution  
213 theory, Fretwell & Lucas, 1970), with fitness being defined as utility units to anglers rather  
214 than prey intake rate as would be the case in natural forager.

215

## 216 Fish population dynamics

217 To represent fish populations striving in each of the ecologically unconnected 121 lakes, we  
218 used an age-structured model with multiple density-dependent population regulation  
219 processes affecting survival and growth and size-dependent survival and fecundity,

220 parameterized with empirical data for pike (Tables 1, 2, Fig. 1). The model is fully presented  
221 elsewhere (Arlinghaus et al., 2009, 2010; Matsumura et al., 2011). Briefly, pike growth was  
222 modelled with a bi-phasic growth model (Lester et al., 2004; equation 1 in Table 1), where  
223 juvenile growth rate is a function of biomass density following empirical data from  
224 Windermere (UK). Changes in juvenile growth affect post-maturation growth and the final  
225 length that can be attained (Lester et al., 2004). Changes in the biomass density not only affect  
226 body length but also fecundity in a density-dependent fashion as reported for pike (Craig &  
227 Kipling, 1983).

228         The first year survival was modelled using a stock-recruitment relationship assuming  
229 Ricker stock-recruitment typical for cannibalistic species such as pike (Edline et al., 2007) of  
230 the form

$$231 \quad N_1/N_L = \alpha \exp(-\beta N_L),$$

232 where  $N_1$  and  $N_L$  represent the density of age-1 fish and hatched larvae, respectively;  $\alpha$   
233 defines the maximum survival rate from spawning to recruitment (i.e., age-1) at low spawner  
234 density, and  $\beta$  describes the strength of density-dependent interactions influencing the cohort's  
235 survival (Walters & Martell, 2004). Alternatively termed,  $\beta$  is the rate of decrease of  
236 recruits/spawner as spawner density increases. Both  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  determine the intrinsic quality of  
237 the pike stock, but only  $\alpha$  strongly affects the slope of the stock-recruitment curve near the  
238 origin and thus the per capita number of recruits at low population density (Walters & Martell,

239 2004). By contrast,  $\beta$  determines the maximum recruitment and has little effects on the slope  
240 near the origin. As most pike stocks were exploited in our model and hence had lower  
241 (exploited) spawning stock biomasses than the virgin population sizes,  $\alpha$  determines the  
242 resiliency of the stock to harvest at low stock sizes and thus the population's productivity in  
243 the exploited state. By contrast,  $\beta$  mainly shapes the carrying capacity of a lake for recruits  
244 and not the per capita production of recruits at low population sizes. Consequently, we used  
245 among-lake variation in  $\alpha$  to represent variation in productivity of pike stocks, and variation  
246 in  $\beta$  to represent variation in carrying capacity among lakes. Parameter values of the  
247 stock-recruitment function (i.e., the mean values of  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ ) were determined to approximate  
248 an empirical relationship reported by Minns et al. (1996) for pike (Table 2).

249         The pike populations in the 121 lakes differed either in productivity, represented by  
250 the parameter  $\alpha$  (which as above mainly governs the slope of the stock-recruitment  
251 relationship at low stock sizes), or in the stock's carrying capacity, represented by the  
252 parameter  $\beta$  (which as above governs the maximum number of recruits). The variation of  
253 the two parameters represented lake heterogeneity in pike population biology and was  
254 assumed to follow a lognormal distribution around a mean. The spatial distribution of lakes  
255 was assumed independent of the lake's biological properties (productivity or carrying  
256 capacity), i.e. there was no correlation in the pike stock's biological properties in  
257 neighbouring lakes.

258 Natural survival after year one was modelled using a size- and density-dependent  
259 empirical relationship published for Windermere pike by Haugen et al. (2007) (equation 9 in  
260 Table 1). Fishing mortality was modelled with a standard catch equation (equation 10 in Table  
261 1) where catch is determined by effort, abundance and the (constant) catchability coefficient  
262 typical for pike (Arlinghaus et al., 2009). Captured fishes were taken home unless protected  
263 by regulations, in which case some level of mortality happened due to catch-and-release  
264 mortality and non-compliance mortality with regulations following empirical findings for  
265 freshwater predatory fish captured by anglers (Muoneke & Childress, 1994; Sullivan, 2002)  
266 (equations 13 and 14 in Table 1). Further details on the model can be found in the publications  
267 mentioned above as well as Table 1.

268

269 Mechanistic model of site choice by anglers

270 We followed economic utility theory when designing a model to represent a

271 probabilistic-based site choice behaviour by anglers (Fenichel et al., 2013a; Hunt et al., 2011;

272 Johnston et al., 2010). We choose the most general (i.e., species independent) multi-attribute

273 utility model published so far on recreational anglers when they are confronted with the

274 choice of choosing lakes in space as a function of travel distance and other utility-determining

275 attributes of the fishing experiences, such as expected catch rate, expected size, regulations,

276 crowding and biological status of the fish stock (Beardmore et al., 2013; Johnston et al., 2015).

277 To explore the heterogeneity among anglers, the raw data of the choice experiment by



278 Beardmore et al. (2013) were analysed with a latent class choice model as well as in an  
279 aggregate fashion to come up with the average angler in the population (see supporting  
280 information). Latent class models statistically determine groups that are maximally different  
281 in their preferences (Swait, 1994). We found that a 4-class model explained the data  
282 statistically well, which divided anglers into four types in terms of maximal variation in site  
283 choice preferences; these anglers were classified in three angler types varying by degree of  
284 recreational specialization (from casual to committed, see Johnston et al., 2010 for a  
285 summary) in the study region and one highly specialized angler that had a preferences for  
286 fishing intensively beyond the study region (see supporting information for details). To study  
287 how this heterogeneity of anglers affected our model outcomes, we also studied the  
288 exploitation patterns of homogeneous anglers (1-class model) where all the anglers are  
289 assumed to be equal in their preferences. Including heterogeneity directly followed the  
290 framework of Johnston et al. (2010, 2013, 2015) assuming that anglers vary in importance  
291 (the so-called part-worth utility, PWU, estimated from the random utility model, see  
292 supporting information for details) attached to specific attributes of the fishing experience and  
293 hence behave differently as the fishing environment changes. Estimated parameter values of  
294 the 4-class (heterogeneous anglers) and 1-class (homogeneous anglers) models are shown in  
295 Table 3.

296 In our simulations, anglers were assumed to choose a fishing site (i.e., a lake)

297 offering maximum utility compared to all other utilities offered by all other lakes and to move  
298 to the lake with the highest utility probabilistically (equations 16 and 17 in Table 1). Note that  
299 although this model assumed utility maximization and perfect knowledge of the utility offered  
300 by all lakes, the actual choice was not deterministic but probabilistic (i.e., suboptimal)  
301 (equation 17 in Table 1), similar to Matsumura et al. (2010) and Hunt et al. (2011). This  
302 agrees with the assumption of bounded rationality common to humans. The weighing factor  
303  $4/121$  in the equation reflected the fact that survey respondents in the stated choice  
304 experiment by Beardmore et al. (2013) had four alternative lakes in the region in addition to  
305 the options for fishing outside the region and no fishing (see supporting information), while  
306 our virtual anglers had a choice of 121 lakes in their landscape.

307         In the simulations, anglers were assumed to have perfect information about the  
308 average fish number to be expected from each lake, the maximum size of fish to be expected  
309 at each lake, and the number of anglers seen at each lakes using information from the  
310 preceding year. This might be considered unrealistic, but novel communication means permit  
311 spread of information about expected catch rates and other lake attributes quickly. However,  
312 we did not consider knowledge about stock status to affect angler choice because it is  
313 unrealistic that managers can derive this information every year; we thus kept the attribute  
314 value at “no knowledge” in all simulations (Table 3). The maximum size of fish captured at  
315 each lake was defined as the 95th percentile of the size distribution of fish caught at the lake

316 during the preceding year. All anglers at a particular lake were assumed to see each other  
317 because of the small size of lakes (10 ha). The annual licence cost for angling in the region  
318 was fixed at 100 €, which represents a typical value for licence money in Germany  
319 (Arlinghaus et al., 2015).

320

### 321 Regional outcome metrics

322 We kept track of a range of social, economic and ecological outcome metrics at the regional  
323 level used to assess the emergent properties of fish-angler interactions at the landscape levels.

324 In terms of social and economic metrics, the choice experiment included two  
325 dimensions of monetary costs that can be used to quantify the (realized) utility of fishing  
326 offered at equilibrium. One was related to travel distance and one related to the direct  
327 inclusion of a monetary cost variable (i.e., annual license cost in Euro). The coefficient  
328 estimated for the latter variable directly represented the marginal utility of income (i.e., the  
329 disutility of losing money), which was used to calculate changes in economic welfare  
330 perceived by anglers at equilibrium for each lake and in an aggregated fashion for the  
331 landscape following standard economic theory (Hahnemann 1984; for an application to  
332 angling, see Dorow et al., 2010). Economic welfare relates to the notion of well-being by  
333 anglers as demand; it is a more suitable concept to economically rank policy options in  
334 recreational fisheries studies than the notion of supply that is focused on provision of fishing  
335 opportunities, such as catch rates. This is because such a supply perspectives neglects all other

336 components of angler utility and well-being other than catch, including spatial aspects related  
337 to the location of lakes in a landscape (Cole & Ward, 1994). Put simply: a high catch rate  
338 fishery maintained close to home produces more benefits to anglers than the same catch rate  
339 offered in remote locations (Cole & Ward, 1994), and this difference in utility can only be  
340 measured by the welfare concept, not by catch rates. Note how previous landscape models  
341 have measured the catch-based fishing quality in separate “travel zones” or “regions” in the  
342 landscape (Mee et al., 2016; Parkinson et al., 2004; Post et al., 2008; Wilson et al., 2016),  
343 which conceptually controls for the disutility of travel. Still such research strictly speaking  
344 only integrates costs, catch rate and size of fish (as components of fishing quality) as  
345 generating utility to anglers. Our approach differs as the utility of a given lake is a function of  
346 multiple catch- and non-catch related utility components (harvest regulations, size of fish,  
347 catch rate, distance, cost, crowding). Most importantly the regional-level utility at equilibrium  
348 across all lakes therefore becomes an emergent property of fish-angler interactions and not  
349 one that is assumed a priori as done in related work (Parkinson et al., 2004).

350         Economic welfare captures the integrated nature of utilities (benefits) offered by  
351 fishing opportunities and hence represents a measure of social yield (Johnston et al., 2010,  
352 2013, 2015). Note that economic welfare is always a relative measure of well-being emerging  
353 from a policy option A compared to some status quo or a policy option B (Cole & Ward,  
354 1994; Fenichel et al., 2013b), i.e., welfare is assessed at the “margins”. We applied such a

355 welfare perspective, rather than potentially incomplete surrogate such as experienced catch  
356 rates or catch-based “fishing quality”, to model runs with and without one-size-fits all harvest  
357 regulations to examine the change in regional level angler welfare stemming from regulations  
358 and the resulting changes in all lake-specific and utility-determining attributes of the  
359 experience directly or indirectly caused by regulation changes (Fig. 1, Welfare measure). The  
360 change in welfare was approximated by the change in the sum of anglers’ lake-specific  
361 willingness to pay (WTP) for a particular scenario compared to the baseline scenario and was  
362 represented in monetary units (€) (Hahnemann, 1984, equations 17 and 18 in Table 1).

363         We choose the no regulation scenario as the baseline and used alternative scenarios  
364 for harvest regulations to evaluate change in WTP when the common set of harvest  
365 regulations was introduced in the model. Because the marginal change in income was  
366 represented by the utility loss of annual license cost, the change in WTP ( $Z_i$  of equation 18 in  
367 Table 1) represented the average change in the angling quality of angler per year for the  
368 angling quality in the entire region, i.e., welfare was a regional-level outcome metric. To  
369 relate our work also to previous catch-rate utilities, we also kept track of regional effort shifts  
370 and catch rates where needed to address our objectives.

371         From an ecological perspective, we estimated additional commonly used  
372 regional-level biological/ecological outcomes (Fig. 1, Conservation measures). Two outcome  
373 criteria were used to represent the status of exploited stocks at equilibrium. We chose these

374 criteria because they were common single-species stock assessment reference points used for  
375 indicating overfished status (Worm et al., 2009). Accordingly, we defined a pike population in  
376 a given lake to be overexploited (i.e., recruitment overfished) when its spawning stock  
377 biomass (SSB) was less than 35% of its pristine, unexploited SSB (Allen et al., 2009; Mace,  
378 1994). We considered the pike stock in a given lake collapsed if its SSB was less than 10% of  
379 its pristine SSB following Worm et al. (2009) and Hunt et al. (2011). We aggregated the  
380 number of exploited or collapsed stocks over the region, to represent regional-level  
381 conservation outcomes.

382

### 383 Outline of analysis

384 Numerical simulations were carried out for a parameter set chosen (Tables 1, 2) to describe  
385 size-selective recreational fishing on spatially structured pike stocks by regionally mobile  
386 anglers with and without the presence of one-size-fits all harvest regulations. Similar to Hunt  
387 et al. (2011), we conducted discrete annual time-step simulations for each management  
388 scenario at a particular size of the angler population for a given residential pattern until the  
389 fish and angler populations reached a dynamic equilibrium after about 150 years. We used 10  
390 different randomized patterns of the lake distribution and calculated an average of the 10  
391 patterns as a value representing each simulation run.

392 In the simulations, we tested several scenarios or varied several variables

393 systematically (elements shown in grey in Fig. 1). When we introduced our welfare measure,  
394 we considered two sets of harvest regulations: a no regulation case and a traditional  
395 one-size-fits all harvest regulation scenario to correspond with typical situations in many  
396 freshwater fisheries landscapes and to represent extremes. In the traditional one-size-fits all  
397 regulation scenario, we used a combination of a minimum-length limit of 50 cm and a daily  
398 bag limit of 3 pike per angler day, which is common in Germany (Arlinghaus et al., 2010) and  
399 some areas in North America (Paukert et al., 2001). In all simulations, we systematically  
400 varied the size of the angler population, which we call potential regional angling effort (to  
401 distinguish it from the realized angling effort, which is an emergent property of fish-angler  
402 interactions locally and in the region; usually only 40–60 % of the potential is realized effort).  
403 We ran simulations with and without the presence of ecological heterogeneity, with and  
404 without the presence of angler heterogeneity (by either assuming the 1-class or the 4-class  
405 angler models, Table 3) and for varying attributes of lake heterogeneity (varying the slope of  
406 the stock-recruitment function or the carrying capacity) while systematically varying the  
407 angler population size because the latter has been found before to strongly affect regional  
408 patterns of overfishing (Hunt et al., 2011).

409 We evaluated regional level outcomes at the dynamic equilibrium by examining both  
410 conservation objectives (SSB) as well as social and economic objectives (biomass yield,  
411 angler welfare and occasionally catch rates). Although angler welfare integrated catch rates

412 endogenously, we singled out catch rates at equilibrium across lakes to systematically assess  
413 catch-based IFD assumptions commonly expressed in landscape studies of freshwater  
414 recreational fisheries (Mee et al., 2016; Parkinson et al., 2004).

415

## 416 Results

417 Objective 1 – the residential pattern shapes the geographical location of effort and  
418 overfishing, but not overall frequency of overfished stocks

419 When lakes were homogenous in their ecology and the (heterogeneous) angler population  
420 lived in one central urbanity in the landscape, the spatial distribution of angling effort (Fig. 2  
421 second row) and lake-specific overfishing (Fig. 3 second row) systematically spread from the  
422 urban centre towards the periphery of the landscape as the potential regional angling effort  
423 density (AED) increased. Note that the overall level of the potential AED the landscape could  
424 support was strongly affected by the presence (Figs. 2 and 3) or absence (Figs. S2 and S3) of  
425 harvest regulations in place: harvest-regulated landscapes required much larger potential AED  
426 before the stocks collapsed entirely. In the urban landscape, the domino-like spread of  
427 overfishing from the central urbanity to the periphery was largely similar in ecologically  
428 homogenous and ecologically heterogeneous lake landscapes when lake heterogeneity was  
429 represented either by variation in productivity or variation in carrying capacity in relation to  
430 the underlying pike stock-recruitment relationship (presence of regulations, Figs. 2 and 3,  
431 absence of harvest regulations, Figs. S2 and S3). In both cases, lakes near the metropolis



432 attracted more angling effort than more remote lakes unless regional fishing effort became  
433 excessively large for fish populations to withstand the angling pressure (Figs. S9–11).

434         The spatial pattern of lake-specific angling effort densities and overfishing at  
435 equilibrium was different in the rural landscape (Figs. 2 and 3 first row) compared to the  
436 urban landscape (Figs. 2 and 3 second row), particularly in relation to the distribution of  
437 angling effort (Fig. 2). Compared to the urban case, in the rural landscape scenario there was a  
438 much more uniform geographic placement of angling effort (Fig. 2, Fig. S2) and overfishing  
439 (Fig. 3, Fig. S3). In the rural landscape the lake heterogeneity in productivity and in carrying  
440 capacity also exerted more influence on effort density patterns and regional-level overfishing  
441 than in the urban case when comparing outcomes to the homogenous lake ecology. These  
442 effects of the rural spatial structure were particularly pronounced in the one-size-fits all policy  
443 scenario (Figs. 2 and 3) compared to the no-regulation case (Figs. S2 and S3). In general,  
444 lakes with greater potential for generating high catch-rate fisheries systematically attracted  
445 more effort, but the effect was much stronger in relation to variation in the slope of the  
446 stock-recruitment curve (productivity) than in variation of the carrying capacity (see  
447 Objective 3 below for details).

448         The analysis so far suggests that the location of attracted effort and overfishing is  
449 strongly driven by the potential AED (representing the size of the regional angler population  
450 in relation to available fisheries) and the residential pattern. By contrast, the aggregated

451 regional-level outcomes of fish stock-angler interactions in terms of number or the fraction of  
452 overfished stocks, the average regional biomass yield (kg of pike per ha per year), and in the  
453 case of comparing a regulated landscape to an unregulated case also angler welfare gains,  
454 were found to be largely independent of the residential pattern or the presence or absence of  
455 lake heterogeneity both in the one-size-fits all harvest regulation (Fig. 4) as well as in the  
456 no-regulation scenario (Fig. S4). It was also largely irrelevant for overall landscape patterns of  
457 overfishing, which particular feature of lake heterogeneity varied in space (productivity vs.  
458 carrying capacity, Fig. 4). What overwhelmingly drove overall landscape outcomes was  
459 merely the size of the regional angler population in relation to available fishing area, i.e.,  
460 potential AED, which often led to a realized effort to be less than 50% of the potential AED  
461 (Fig. 4, Fig. S4). For the parameter set we choose, in the no regulation case, a potential AED  
462 of about 80-90 angling-h ha<sup>-1</sup> led to regional-level maximum sustainable yield (MSY), but  
463 also to a sizable fraction of about 20–40% of recruitment-overfished stocks under  
464 regional-level MSY (Fig. S4). Note that the fraction of overfished stocked rapidly increased  
465 when the potential AED moved from 80 to about 110 angling-h ha<sup>-1</sup>, and correspondingly the  
466 regional-level yield dropped, suggesting that a management strategy focused on regional-level  
467 MSY may render the system vulnerable to overfishing. There were corresponding trends in  
468 the regulated landscape, albeit at higher potential AED levels because the populations were  
469 better protected from overharvest (Fig. 4). Relative to the no-regulation case and at identical

470 potential AED, one-size fits all harvest regulations led to more realized effort attracted to the  
471 landscape, a reduction in the number of overexploited lakes and maintenance of higher  
472 regional yield, which also held at large potential AED values (Fig. 5). In contrast to the  
473 biomass yield, average angler welfare constantly rose with increasing potential AED in the  
474 regulated landscape (Figs. 4 and 5). This finding was caused by the poor state of fishing in the  
475 unregulated case in the absence of regulations (Fig. S4) used as a baseline to estimate welfare  
476 gains (Fig. 4). Therefore, as a regional-level metric, angler welfare does not show a maximum  
477 that may be used as a management target (Figs. 4 and 5) as long as the unregulated case is  
478 used as a baseline. By contrast, regional MSY followed dome-shaped patterns typical for  
479 exploited fish populations in single lakes and thus maybe used as a regional management  
480 objective among others.

481  
482 Objectives 2 – heterogeneous anglers exert greater cumulative fishing pressure in the  
483 region than homogenous populations of anglers

484 When we assumed an average empirically grounded angler type estimated from the same  
485 choice data for German anglers, we found quite different ecological and social outcomes  
486 compared to when we assumed heterogeneous anglers in the model. Figure 6 presents the  
487 results for a one-size-fits-all harvest regulation policy, and the corresponding unregulated  
488 outcomes of angler heterogeneity are shown in Figure S5. The number of overexploited lakes  
489 predicted in the 1-class model (homogeneous angler model) was always smaller than the

490 number of overexploited lakes predicted in the 4-class model (heterogeneous model). One  
491 important contributor was the difference in the realized AED, which was always higher when  
492 multiple angler types exploited the regional fishery (Fig. 6). The maximum average regional  
493 yield did not differ between the 1-class and 4-class models (Fig. 6) because MSY was caused  
494 by purely biological properties of the fish stock. However, as the angler population size  
495 increased the total regional yield was predictably smaller in the 4-class model because the  
496 diverse anglers exerted greater harvesting pressure (i.e., realised angling effort) at the same  
497 potential AED compared to homogenous anglers.

498         The aggregated regional welfare of anglers as measured by WTP change from the  
499 unregulated to the regulated landscape was substantially greater in the 4-class model  
500 compared to the 1-class model. One large contributor to this effect was the more depressed  
501 baseline overfishing state at high potential AED in the unregulated landscape (Fig. S5)  
502 because the degree of overfishing caused by heterogeneous anglers was much more severe  
503 compared to the state of overfishing caused by homogenous anglers. Correspondingly, the  
504 welfare gains of regulations were appreciably higher for heterogeneous anglers compared to  
505 homogenous anglers. The difference in ecological and social regional outcomes among  
506 homogenous and heterogeneous anglers increased as the angler population size increased, but  
507 there was very little impact of residential patterns on regional-level outcomes stemming from  
508 the presence or absence of angler heterogeneity (Fig. 6).

509           The above mentioned effects of angler heterogeneity were caused by a complex  
510 pattern of spatial lake substitution patterns as a function angler preferences interacting with  
511 ecological processes of fish stock renewal. Because residential patterns did not matter much  
512 for determining the overall regional-level effects of angler heterogeneity (Fig. 6), we confine  
513 our example of where specific angler types were fishing in the landscape in the regulated  
514 urban case where we separate different travel zones of interest from the metropolis (Fig. 7, see  
515 Fig. S6 for the unregulated case). In line with our empirical data from northern Germany, the  
516 angler class 1 (committed anglers, supplemental material) made up 51.4% of the entire angler  
517 population, but this class accounted for a disproportionately larger proportion of the total  
518 angling trips taken by the angler population as a whole. The proportion of class 1 anglers in  
519 the total angling effort increased as the distance from the metropolis increased (Fig. 7)  
520 because class 1 anglers enjoyed less disutility from travel distance. By contrast, the angler  
521 classes 2 and 3 (active and casual anglers) preferred angling in lakes nearby their residence  
522 and thus rarely visited remote lakes (in zones 3 and 4 in Fig. 7). When an average type of  
523 angler was assumed instead (right panels in Fig. 7), the realised angling effort was overall  
524 lower than in the heterogeneous angler model (left panels in Fig. 7). This is because the  
525 average angler did not visit the remote lakes in travel zones 3 and 4 as often compared to the  
526 numerically dominant class 1 anglers in the heterogeneous model. The difference became  
527 more pronounced when the angler population size (potential AED) increased and the

528 corresponding angling quality decreased because this elevated the visits to remote lakes by  
529 highly committed class-1 anglers in the heterogeneous population (Fig. 7). We can conclude  
530 that regional variation in the residency of different type of anglers will exert complex effects  
531 on landscape-scale social and ecological outcomes.

532

533 Objectives 3 – ecological variation in production maintains catch variation unless the  
534 angler population size is excessive and lakes vary in carrying capacity not productivity  
535 When lakes differed in their carrying capacity in the absence of regulations and were  
536 exploited by a large heterogeneous angler population, lakes of higher intrinsic quality  
537 (meaning lakes that could maximally host more fishes) tended to be exploited more heavily  
538 than lower-quality lakes, as can be inferred from a larger drop in SSB/pristine SSB as pristine  
539 SSB levels increased in both rural (Fig. S7b) and urban landscapes (Fig. S8b). In other words,  
540 positive correlations between the lake quality and degree of exploitation were found, in  
541 particular, when the angler population size was large in all landscape types (Figs. S7b and  
542 S8b). As the regional angler population size increased, the difference in the catch rates offered  
543 by the lakes in the landscape at equilibrium decreased leading to regional-level  
544 homogenization of catch rates among lakes across all lakes varying in carrying capacity in  
545 both rural (Fig. S7b) and urban landscapes (Fig. S8b).

546           The landscape pattern of exploitation at equilibrium differed when lakes varied in  
547 their productivity at low pike population size (slope of the stock-recruitment curve) instead of

548 the carrying capacity. Compared to lakes varying in carrying-capacity (Figs. S7b and S8b),  
549 more productive lakes were exploited less heavily than low-productive lakes, and a  
550 homogenization of the exploited SSBs relative to pristine SBB across the productivity  
551 gradient, rather than a homogenization of catch rates, emerged as the potential AED increased  
552 in both rural (Fig. S7a) and urban landscapes (Fig. S8a). This is in contrast to the inverse  
553 relationship among pristine SSB and the exploited SSB/pristine SSB seen before for the  
554 variation in carrying-capacity among lakes (Figs. S7b and S8b). Lake heterogeneity in  
555 productivity at low population sizes also led to the maintenance of larger catch rates in  
556 highly-productive lakes at equilibrium compared to low productive lakes in rural (Fig. S7a)  
557 and urban landscapes (Fig. S8a), which contrasted with the more consistent homogenization  
558 in catch rate across lakes in all landscape types for lakes varying in carrying capacity (Figs.  
559 S7b and S8b). Substantially more variability among lakes varying in productivity persisted in  
560 the urban case also at high potential angler densities (Fig. S8a). One reason was the  
561 systematic impact of distance on lake attractiveness (utility) to anglers, which maintained fish  
562 populations at higher levels as the distance from the metropolis increased (see urban case with  
563 no regulations in Fig. S10 compared to rural case with no regulations in Fig. S9). Overall,  
564 substantial among-lake variation at the same distance in terms of annual trips that were  
565 attracted and the catch rates offered to anglers were maintained at equilibrium when lakes  
566 differed in productivity, until the angler population became excessive leading to complete

567 collapse (Figs. S10 and S11).

568           The implementation of a one-size-fits-all harvest regulations (minimum-length limit  
569 of 50 cm and daily bag limit of three pike) in all lakes in the landscape modified the  
570 association of overfishing and lake quality and the ecological and social outcomes just  
571 described (Figs. 8 and 9). However, no complete reversal of the systematic patterns of the  
572 relationships of lake heterogeneity and landscape level outcomes mentioned above was found.  
573 Instead, some of the features became more pronounced. Overall, the effect of the harvest  
574 regulations was most strongly observed in higher-quality lakes than in lower-quality lakes  
575 (Figs. 8 and 9). In particular, the difference in the expected catch rates at equilibrium among  
576 high-quality and low-quality lakes became more pronounced under harvest regulations, with  
577 more productive lakes and lakes with higher carrying capacity generally offering higher catch  
578 rates than less productive lakes or lakes with lower carrying capacity in both rural (Fig. 8) and  
579 urban landscapes (Fig. 9). The positive correlation between variation in productivity and catch  
580 rate was more pronounced than that between variation in carrying capacity and catch rate (Fig.  
581 8 and 9). In the case where variation in lake quality was arising from variation in carrying  
582 capacity, the negative correlation of pristine SSB and the exploited SSB/pristine SSB seen in  
583 the absence of regulations (Figs. S7b and S8b) was observed only when the angler population  
584 size was very large in both the rural and urban cases (Figs. 8b and 9b). Also, lakes with lower  
585 carrying capacity were only exploited more heavily than lakes with large carrying capacity



586 when the angler population size was small and only in a rural scenario (Fig. 8b). In the case of  
587 variation among lakes in productivity this effect was even more pronounced, turning the  
588 correlation of pristine SSB and the exploited SSB/pristine SSB systematically positive across  
589 all levels of the potential AED, with no homogenization of catch rates observed among lakes  
590 (Figs. 8a and 9a, see also Figs. S11 and S12 for changes of catch rates with distance). The  
591 catch-rate homogenization was much less pronounced or not pronounced at all in the case of  
592 variation among lakes in carrying capacity when regulations were present (Figs. 8b and 9b,  
593 see also Figs. S11 and S12) compared to the no regulation case (Figs. S7b and S8b).

594           Similar patterns were observed in the urban (Fig. 9) and rural regulated landscapes  
595 (Fig. 8) in regulated landscapes compared to the no-regulation case (Figs. S8 and S7). Again,  
596 in the harvest-regulated landscape along the gradient of lake quality substantially greater  
597 among lake variability pike population size and catch rates and effort attracted was  
598 maintained in equilibrium in the rural case (Fig. 8) compared to the urban case (Fig. 9).

599 Substantial variation in effort attracted and catch rates were present at equilibrium for lakes  
600 varying in distance in both the rural (Fig. S11) and urban regulated landscapes (Fig. S12).  
601 Variation in lakes in productivity led to somewhat greater distance-related variation in effort  
602 attracted and catch rates in both landscapes compared to variation in carrying capacity (Figs.  
603 S11 and S12).

604

## 605 **Discussion**

606 We provide a general framework to examine spatial problems related to fish-stock-angler  
607 interactions and thereby contribute to an emerging literature of modelling complex adaptive  
608 social-ecological systems (Arlinghaus et al., 2017; Schlüter et al., 2012) where macro scale  
609 outcomes (e.g., regional effort distribution and overfishing) emerge from a high number of  
610 micro-level interactions (e.g., angler-fish stock interactions) (Levin et al., 2013). Our work  
611 presents the most general model for recreational fisheries published so far. It is distinguished  
612 from previous landscape models in recreational fisheries (in particular Hunt et al., 2011; Post  
613 & Parkinson, 2012; Post et al., 2008) by three key features.

614         First, the fish population model is age-structured, rather than being a biomass model,  
615 thereby allowing size-dependent catch expectations and the effects of size-based harvest  
616 limits to be represented; both strongly affect utility and thus effort dynamics of anglers  
617 (Arlinghaus et al., 2014; Dorow et al., 2010; Hunt 2005) and hence should be included in any  
618 realistic model of recreational fisheries (Askey et al., 2013).

619         Second, we used a mechanistic model of angler behaviour, predicted from an  
620 empirically estimated multi-dimensional utility function (Beardmore et al., 2013). This  
621 allowed regional outcomes to be emergent properties of model runs and avoided to investigate  
622 equilibrium conditions “forced” on the model by strong assumptions, such as the one that at  
623 an IFD equilibrium all fish stocks should be fished down to an average catch rate (Parkinson

624 et al., 2004). Although intuitively appealing, we think there are limitations in the analogy of  
625 anglers and fish forming natural predator-prey systems because the fitness of the human  
626 predator (forager) far extends beyond resource intake rates (i.e., catch rates or other measures  
627 of catch quality) and thus its behaviour is more complex than the one of natural foragers.  
628 Previous modelling work has already shown that assuming anglers to be mainly or  
629 exclusively driven in their behaviour by catch expectations can lead to unrealistic predictions  
630 about how best to serve their expectations from a management perspective (Johnston et al.,  
631 2010). We therefore suggest our model is mechanistically superior to models that assume that  
632 human foragers are simply guided by catch expectations, unless one can show that a particular  
633 angler population is indeed mainly driven by catch (Hunt et al., 2011). Even in the recent  
634 work by Wilson et al. (2016) and Mee et al. (2016) where the trade-offs of expected numbers  
635 and size of fish were elegantly expressed using region-dependent catch quality “isopleths”,  
636 substantial among lake variation in catch qualities remained at equilibrium, suggesting more  
637 factors than catch aspects affected lake utility and in turn angler participation and effort  
638 allocation. Therefore, we suggest the null model for representing angler behaviour is one that  
639 assumes a multi-dimensional utility function composed of both catch- and non-catch  
640 attributes, rather than a fitness function exclusively driven by catch expectations.

641 Third, rather than focusing on just selected regional outcomes (e.g., number of  
642 overexploited stocks, Hunt et al., 2011; or fishing quality, Mee et al., 2016; Post et al., 2008),

643 we calculated and presented several emerging outcomes jointly, which encompassed  
644 regional-level ecological (e.g., regional overfishing) and socio-economic objectives (e.g.,  
645 regional angler welfare) as well as more traditional objectives of recreational fisheries (e.g.,  
646 catch rates and effort). Thereby, our model accommodated important trade-offs in  
647 management objectives and associated criteria explicitly.

648 Our key result is that landscape patterns of overexploitation are an integrated  
649 function of angler and lake heterogeneity as moderated by residential pattern, angler  
650 population size, the type of lake quality variation (productivity or carrying capacity) and the  
651 presence or absence of harvest regulations. In terms of largely robust predictions we 1)  
652 confirmed earlier studies that in urban landscapes lakes around the aggregation of effort will  
653 receive greater effort and overfishing risk than more remote lakes (*sensu* Post et al., 2002;  
654 Carpenter & Brock, 2004; Post et al., 2008), 2) found that angler population size and angler  
655 heterogeneity aggravates the degree of overfishing by spreading effort more across lakes  
656 (similar to Johnston et al., 2010 in a single lake case and Hunt et al., 2011 in a regional case),  
657 and 3) reported that the previously proposed hypothesis that higher (ecological) quality lakes  
658 will be systematically overfished by regionally mobile anglers (Parkinson et al., 2004) and  
659 that at equilibrium all lakes (within zones of similar travel distance) will be offering similar  
660 catch rates (Parkinson et al., 2004) or catch qualities (Mee et al., 2016; Wilson et al., 2016)  
661 are confined to particular cases or empirical systems and cannot be easily generalized. In fact

662 the positive association of lake quality and degree of overexploitation (as judged by SSB  
663 relative to pristine SSB) was only found for unregulated (be it rural or urban) landscapes at  
664 high potential angling effort when lakes varied in carrying capacity, but not in productivity. A  
665 further clear-cut result we found was that an increasing angler population size will have  
666 systematic overfishing effects and reduce both equilibrium stock sizes and average catch rates  
667 irrespective of residential pattern, lake heterogeneity and the presence of angler diversity, but  
668 unless we have extreme situations (e.g., exceedingly high potential angling effort), substantial  
669 among lake variation in expected catch rates still remained. We discuss our detailed results  
670 first with reference to the three objectives stated in the introduction before moving to model  
671 limitations and implications for management and policy making.

672

673 Discussion of the three principal objectives

674 The first key finding of our modelling experiment was that the spatial patterns of angling  
675 effort attracted and regional overfishing were dependent on the residential patterns in a given  
676 landscape as moderated by the angler population size and was less affected by ecological  
677 heterogeneity among lakes. Our work agreed with previous landscape models reporting that  
678 overfishing of spatially structured fish stocks proceeds in a systematic fashion from  
679 aggregation of high latent angler effort in urban landscapes towards the periphery (Carpenter  
680 & Brock, 2004; Hunt et al., 2011; Post et al., 2008), and we found this pattern was not  
681 strongly affected by lake heterogeneity in urban environments. At equilibrium urban

682 environments also maintained greater among-lake variation in expected catch rates compared  
683 to rural case because urban environments always offered some effort “refuges” in lakes in  
684 remote localities. Such effects were not present in rural landscapes, and even in an urban  
685 landscape domino-like overharvesting at high angler population sizes did not occur when the  
686 landscape was regulated by harvest regulations, supporting earlier work by Hunt et al. (2011)  
687 and Post and Parkinson, (2012).

688           Results from urban landscapes have so far dominated the literature on freshwater  
689 fisheries landscapes (e.g., Hunt et al., 2011; Post et al., 2008). We show that findings from  
690 urban cases do not hold for rural landscapes in relation to the spatial arrangement of  
691 overfished stocks when the regional angler population is moderate or low. That said,  
692 aggregative metrics of regional-level outcomes, e.g., the total number of overfished stocks,  
693 were found to not strongly deviate in urban and rural landscapes and be less affected by lake  
694 heterogeneity, suggesting that when the aim is to outline broad-scale outcomes simulation of  
695 urban landscapes may prove suitable approximations independent of exact knowledge of  
696 local-level productivity of ecosystems.

697           In relation to our second objective we can conclude that simplifying a heterogeneous  
698 angler population to a homogenous one, or to aggregates such as “angling effort”, in  
699 modelling experiments risks severely underestimating landscape-level realized effort and  
700 regional overfishing and also strongly affects the location to which effort (and overfishing

701 risk) is attracted. This finding agrees with recent literature reviews who noted that being  
702 explicit about which behavioural responses to expect is crucially important for understanding  
703 and managing recreational fisheries (Arlinghaus et al., 2017; Ward et al., 2016). Moreover,  
704 not accounting for angler heterogeneity in preferences in behaviour underestimates the social  
705 welfare gains from harvest regulations and thus also bears strong relations to economic and  
706 managerial dimensions (Cole & Ward, 1994). Our work confirms single-lake bio-economic  
707 models in recreational fisheries showing that accounting for variation in angler types through  
708 the integrated nature of multi-attribute angler utility is important for inferring fish population  
709 developments and identification of optimal input and output regulations that maximize  
710 benefits to anglers and minimize ecological impacts (Johnston et al., 2010, 2013, 2015).  
711 Hence, it is not only of narrative importance of being explicit about which angler typologies,  
712 and relatedly variation in preferences and behaviour, exist in a given SES of recreational  
713 fisheries if the aim of the modelling experiment is to provide robust insights for management  
714 (*sensu* Cole & Ward, 1994; Fenichel and Abbott 2014; Johnston et al., 2010; Post et al., 2008).  
715 Our finding about the large importance of angler diversity for outcomes constitutes a relevant  
716 innovation because all previous landscape models of recreational fisheries have either  
717 assumed various scenarios of homogenous anglers (that vary by importance attached to catch  
718 vs- non-catch utility components, Hunt et al., 2011) or have aggregated effort of all angler  
719 types jointly (Camp et al., 2015; Post et al., 2008), sometimes further separate by “travel

720 zones” that control for the systematic effort sorting effect caused by angler variation in  
721 accepting travel costs for the benefits of accessing lakes offering high utility (Mee et al.,  
722 2016). We think that future studies are well advised to be more explicit about which angler  
723 type the model is designed to represent, and we suggest that the angler specialization  
724 framework is particularly suited to address angler heterogeneity (Bryan 1977; Johnston et al.,  
725 2010). Different angler types not only differ in their travel propensity, but may also strongly  
726 differ in their skill and catchability (Johnston et al., 2010; Ward et al., 2013a,b), which we did  
727 not explicitly model. Further work on the relationship of angler preferences and  
728 skill/catchability is needed to improve the modelling of angler heterogeneity on landscapes.

729         In relation to our third and last objective, we confirmed previous studies (in  
730 particular Hunt et al., 2011) that the assumed positive correlation among exploitation impact  
731 and the ecological quality (productivity and carrying capacity) of a given lake (Parkinson et  
732 al., 2004) is to be expected only under very particular conditions and is by no means a general  
733 result. By the same token, according to our work and others (Hunt et al., 2011; Matsumura et  
734 al., 2010), a catch-based IFD where the lake-level catch rates, or more generally catch-based  
735 fishing qualities (Mee et al., 2016; Wilson et al., 2016), are homogenized across a region is  
736 not to be generally expected in recreational fisheries. In fact, based on our model we claim  
737 that the systematic overexploitation of high quality fisheries should not be expected as a  
738 default, and we also found limited evidence in our model for systematic homogenization of



739 catch rates across lakes. These results agreed with previous modelling studies that also used a  
740 multi-dimensional utility function driving angler behaviour (Hunt et al., 2011) or assumed  
741 suboptimal patch choices of foragers (Matsumura et al., 2010) similar to the way we  
742 represented site choice behaviour of human foragers in our model. We are thus confident that  
743 our findings about departures of catch-based IFD relate to the mechanistic assumption that the  
744 fitness of the human forager relates to multiple dimensions, both catch- and non-catch related,  
745 and that human foragers suboptimally and probabilistically choose lakes offering the highest  
746 utility. Landmark work by Wilson et al. (2016) and Mee et al. (2016) that report that anglers  
747 homogenize catch qualities to size-number quality isopleths in regions differing by travel  
748 costs from the urban environment of Vancouver in fact “control” for three key dimensions of  
749 utility to anglers (size, catch rate and distance). Although some form of IFD was found in  
750 their stocking-based rainbow trout fisheries, substantial among lake variation in equal travel  
751 zones remained, most likely because other aspects than those measured affected angler utility  
752 and hence site choice.

753         In our study, the strongest evidence for a systematic overexploitation of high quality  
754 lakes and for catch-rate homogenization effects across both the lake quality and distance  
755 gradients in urban cases was revealed when the variation in ecological lake quality was  
756 caused by lake heterogeneity in carrying capacities in the absence of harvest regulations and  
757 for very large (and heterogeneous) angler population sizes (Figs. S7 and S8). When harvest

758 regulations were present, however, these effects were only present at exceedingly high angler  
759 population sizes (Figs. 8 and 9). By contrast, when lakes varied in their productivity, more  
760 productive lakes were less heavily exploited and they also maintained larger catch rates  
761 compared to low quality lakes (Figs 8, 9, S7 and S8). Our results thus appeared to contradict  
762 the idea that homogenization of catch-based fishing quality or catch rates across fisheries  
763 landscapes in zones of equal access costs (Mee et al., 2016; Parkinson et al., 2004). However,  
764 this is not the case. Based on our study, for a catch-based IFD to happen, angler utility must  
765 be mainly or exclusively about expected catches, lakes need to be open to a large pool of  
766 anglers, with easy access, variation in lake quality must be based on carrying capacity, but not  
767 in the slope of the stock-recruitment curve (productivity), and no harvest regulations offering  
768 protection to the fishes should be present. Most of these ingredients apply to the  
769 stocking-reliant rainbow trout fisheries in British Columbia, for which a catch-based IFD in  
770 recreational fisheries was reported (Mee et al., 2016; Post & Parkinson, 2012; Post et al., 2002,  
771 2008; Wilson et al., 2016). Importantly, as mentioned before in these studies a fishing-quality  
772 based IFD has been reported in travel regions varying in travel distance from the metropolis  
773 (Mee et al., 2016), which essentially controls for the systematic impact of travel on utility and  
774 site choice behaviour. Thereby, a key non-catch dimension of angler utility, distance, is  
775 removed and the angler behaviour within a given zone is in turn affected mainly by catch  
776 expectations related to catch rates and sizes of fish that are captured. The British Columbian

777 lake systems are open-access to a large pool of anglers residing in Vancouver, they are mainly  
778 directed at harvest-oriented anglers, the lakes have few harvest regulations and variation in  
779 catches and sizes of fish to be expected among lakes is essentially a function of the stocking  
780 density as most lake rainbow trout stocks are not self-recruiting. In such situations, stocking  
781 essentially determines the carrying capacity because there is no internal renewal process at  
782 low stock sizes similar to the effects stemming from variation in the slope of a  
783 stock-recruitment curve in a naturally reproducing stock. According to our study, all these  
784 conditions indeed foster the emergence of a catch-based IFD, in line with the results from  
785 British Columbia. However, these conditions are not generally present in other fisheries  
786 landscapes, where a large fraction of fisheries are based on naturally recruiting fishes that  
787 naturally vary in productivity (i.e., slope of the stock-recruitment relationship) among systems  
788 and where at least some form of harvest regulation is present. Under such conditions, our  
789 model does not predict a catch-based IFD to easily emerge. Instead, in most landscapes the  
790 maintenance of substantial variation among fisheries in fishing utility (“quality”), rather than  
791 its erosion, is to be expected at equilibrium.

792         Following our model, in unregulated landscapes variation in productivity (i.e.,  
793 population renewal speed) among lakes will either lead to homogenization of overfishing,  
794 while maintaining high catch rates in more productive stocks, or help maintaining both high  
795 spawning stock biomasses and high catch rates under regulated conditions in the most

796 productive stocks. The reasons for the strongly different patterns of the SSB and catch rates in  
797 the exploited equilibrium in relation to varying carrying capacity and population renewal (i.e.,  
798 productivity) in our model are purely ecological, confirming the importance of studying both  
799 ecological and social processes in coupled SES. Variation in carrying capacity will mainly  
800 lead to variation in catch rates in the unexploited state, which cannot be sustained as angling  
801 effort responds. Consequently, due to rapid effort responses of anglers at equilibrium yield,  
802 and relatedly catch rates, produced by exploited fish stocks are rather insensitive to increases  
803 in carrying capacity, and similarly variation in catch-dependent angling quality at MSY is  
804 largely independent of underlying carrying capacities of a given lake (Parkinson et al., 2004).  
805 By contrast, yield and catch-related angling quality increase strongly with increasing  
806 productivity (slope of the stock-recruitment relationship) at MSY (Parkinson et al., 2004)  
807 leading to more resilient stocks, unless they are exploited by a large pool of anglers leading to  
808 their collapse (Post et al., 2002, 2008). Hence, variation in population renewal processes at  
809 low stock sizes (i.e., productivity) can better maintain fish stocks and catch rates under  
810 exploiting conditions by compensating for losses due to fishing, which variation in carrying  
811 capacity alone cannot achieve (Walters & Martell, 2004).

812 By contrast, as implied by our model management interventions that modify the  
813 population renewal capacity (e.g., due to enhancement of juvenile habitat) rather than carrying  
814 capacity per se can have sustained, systematic effects on maintaining variation in catch rates

815 and spawning biomasses in fisheries landscapes. In fact, when lakes vary in productivity  
816 rather than carrying capacity and when a base set of harvest regulations is introduced, in our  
817 model high-quality lakes become less overexploited compared to low-quality lakes. In other  
818 words, high productivity coupled with a protection of young, immature fish through a basal  
819 set of size-limits is key for lakes to avoid being systematically overfished (Post & Parkinson,  
820 2012).

## 821 822 Limitations and extensions

823 As any model, our work has several limitations stemming from simplification of processes  
824 and structural uncertainty. On the biological side, our work constitutes a single-species  
825 age-structured model that omits multi-species interactions in complex food webs and  
826 represents density-dependence phenomenologically rather than being an emergent property of  
827 size-structured interactions. However, pike populations exhibit a high degree of intraspecific  
828 population regulation through cannibalism and overall show stable dynamics (Persson et al.,  
829 2004). Moreover, most of the size- and density dependence was estimated from one stock  
830 (Windermere) that shows exceptionally high quality data. Obviously our model cannot be  
831 used to derive predictions for specific empirical systems, but we think that we have captured  
832 the most essential population dynamical processes in a rigorous fashion, with substantial  
833 empirical data support.

834 A further limitation of our work that might limit the direct comparison to other

835 landscape models may be inherent in the different spatial scales. For example, our landscape  
836 scale encompassed 150 km, while Post et al. (2008) modelled > 1000 km, and Hunt et al.  
837 (2011) about 300 km. The reason for the different scales in the three studies relates to the  
838 calibration of the angler model, which was always empirically grounded to local conditions.  
839 Obviously, a larger scale in our model would have substantially affected the location of effort  
840 because anglers in northern Germany for which the base angler model was calibrated are not  
841 used to travel much farther than about 200 km for a single angling trip. Hence, the distance  
842 effects might have been stronger if the choice model used to construct the travel cost  
843 coefficient would have exposed anglers in the model to much larger travel distances.  
844 Modelling a landscape that is much larger than what the empirical anglers were normally  
845 exposed to would have been to extrapolate beyond the parameter space used to train the  
846 model, and hence was not done in the present study.

847         What might more fundamentally affect model outcomes are connections among the  
848 ecological systems, e.g., through rivers or creeks linking lakes. Newbold and Massey (2010)  
849 showed that such spatial connectivity of the fish resources affects the estimation of utility  
850 models and may demand alternative structural models of angler site choices that captures  
851 species sorting behaviour and spatially connected population dynamics. Further work in this  
852 area is certainly warranted.

853         We assumed that anglers were omniscient about the utilities offered by each of the

854 lakes in the landscape and that the past year's experiences were instantaneously exchanged  
855 among all anglers. In reality, anglers will of course not be omniscient about all lake utilities  
856 and they might also follow different strategies in terms of lake choices than we assumed. For  
857 example, rather than being utility maximizers anglers might follow different approach to lake  
858 choice (e.g., satisficing, Wierzbicki 1982). Relatedly, place attachment, habitat, tradition and  
859 the attainment of angling experience and skill with a given lake over time may all lead to  
860 "local adaptation" and a tendency for anglers to always visit familiar sites. Such effects were  
861 not included in the present model and are certainly relevant sources of uncertainty. Anglers  
862 may also strongly vary in skill (and catchability, Ward et al., 2013a), and hence the "update  
863 speed" of which catch to expect in a given lake may systematically vary among anglers, in  
864 turn affecting outcomes. All of these aspects could have strong effects on regional distribution  
865 patterns and thus need to be accounted for in future work.

866 We simplified our models by assuming equal skill among anglers, no social  
867 interactions between anglers other than crowding effects emerging from the utility offered by  
868 lakes, no opportunity for learning and adaptation of preferences and no social networks. All of  
869 these assumptions are unlikely to hold in any empirical system because anglers are known to  
870 differ in skill (Dorow et al., 2010; Ward et al., 2013), are unlikely to be omniscient (Hunt et  
871 al., 2011), are characterized by shifting expectations and preferences (Gale, 1987), and quite  
872 certainly form social groups and networks of like-minded friends and peers (Hahn, 1991;

873 Ditton et al., 1992) through which information flow happens (Little & McDonald, 2007).  
874 Such information flow changes in quality and quantity through rapid changes in novel  
875 communication technology (e.g., social media, Martin et al., 2012). Missing links among  
876 nodes in angler networks can then block information about fishing opportunities if there is  
877 strong modularization in the network (Little & McDonald, 2007), or it may foster the  
878 exploitation of lakes through slow, but steady, information spread in small world networks.  
879 The latter effect is more likely at time scales that we measured, which is why we feel  
880 confident that the lack of consideration of among-angler networks did not fundamentally bias  
881 our long-term predictions. However, anglers in networks may derive utility from the utility  
882 experienced by fellow peers (e.g., catch of a trophy by a close friend), which can affect the  
883 policy options and create sites the networks prefers as a whole (Neilson and Wichmann 2014).  
884 Also, isolated events like as the popularization of exceptional fishing opportunities may lead  
885 to a systematic and pervasive shift in effort (Carpenter et al., 1994) – a dynamic not  
886 represented in our model. All these issues are likely related to angler heterogeneity (some  
887 anglers are more networked than others, some anglers are more receptive to media than others,  
888 Ditton et al., 1992), which we found will strongly affect the location of effort and hence  
889 landscape patterns in particular empirical systems. But despite this empirically relevant  
890 complexity that should be certainly tackled in future work, we think that the long-term  
891 strategic predictions that our simple model allows may nevertheless serve as qualitative



892 approximations of which family of outcomes to expect under particular situations.

893           Finally, limitations relates to omission of specific details of the governance system.

894 We explored open-access fisheries where anglers can choose lakes in an open landscape and a

895 social planner installs one-size-fits all policies for the entire landscape, as it typical in North

896 America (Lester et al., 2003). However, in West Germany and many other areas of Europe

897 small angling clubs manage restricted water areas and anglers cannot easily switch among

898 small angling clubs (Daedlow et al., 2011), which will lead to different dynamics in the region

899 than modelled in our paper. Again, it will be worthwhile to analyse more constrained choices

900 and what landscape level outcomes to expect.

901

902 Policy implications and future directions

903 Based on our work we can derive some management implications of potential relevance to

904 policy makers and managers charged with managing freshwater fisheries landscapes. We

905 outline four due to limitations in space.

906           First, introduction of harvest regulations following a simple one-size-fits-all policy

907 can decrease regional overfishing and maintain high yields, while at the same time strongly

908 increasing angler welfare compared to the unregulated case. Our work confirms earlier

909 landscape studies that reported that to manage open-access freshwater fisheries and avoid

910 sequential collapses some base level of regulations or other type of management intervention

911 is necessary (Cole & Ward, 1994; Lester et al., 2003; Post & Parkinson, 2012). However, it is

912 very likely that a diversity of management tools rather than one-size-fits all policies as  
913 examined in our model will produce better outcomes (Carpenter & Brock, 2004; Post &  
914 Parkinson, 2012). Future work is reserved for using our model to test the design (type and  
915 regional placement) of various policy and management options to optimize specific  
916 management objectives.

917         Second, in line with previous work (Post & Parkinson, 2012) our work implies that  
918 to achieve high regional level fish yield and avoid localized collapses of stocks, constraints on  
919 total effort (and by the same token total fishing mortality) are necessary if the latent regional  
920 angling effort is exceedingly high relative to available fishing area under open-access  
921 situations. We found that the transition from a situation that produces regional MSY to rapid  
922 collapse is narrow in terms of what average angling effort per hectare the system can maintain,  
923 which suggests that a precautionary approach may be needed to limit the total number of  
924 anglers for a given landscape if the aim is to manage for MSY. Similarly, our work and related  
925 studies suggests that if the objective is to minimize the number of overexploited stocks at high  
926 potential angling effort constraints on fishing mortality (e.g., through implementation of  
927 restrictive harvest regulations), strategic use of stocking near high aggregations of anglers (to  
928 “absorb” mobile angling effort) or even effort controls will be necessary in at least a fraction  
929 of the otherwise fully accessible ecosystems (Cox & Walters, 2002; Post & Parkinson, 2012).

930         Third, our model results exposed some fundamental trade-offs that managers may

931 need to navigate when managing mobile anglers in freshwater landscapes interacting with  
932 local ecological processes of density and size-dependent population regulation under  
933 open-access situations. In particular, in urban environments it may not be possible to  
934 maximize regional-level objectives (e.g., regional MSY) with one-size-fits-all regulations  
935 without collapsing some of the stocks in the landscape. This finding is equivalent to insights  
936 from multi-species models in the marine environment where achieving multi-species MSY  
937 comes at the cost of collapsing some stocks (Worm et al., 2009). Fully avoiding collapse  
938 when targeting regional-level MSY may only be possible in an open-access situations where  
939 anglers will always dynamically respond to changes in local fish availability by radical  
940 landscape-level effort controls, continuous stocking or implementation of total  
941 catch-and-release policies with low hooking mortality in the absence of illegal harvest  
942 (Johnston et al., 2015; Post & Parkinson, 2012). Further simulation work is needed to address  
943 this important issue.

944         Finally, although we did not directly model stocking-based recreational fisheries,  
945 some of our findings can be interpreted in light of previous landscape work under stocked  
946 situations, calling into question the efficiency of one-time stock enhancement activities in  
947 non-recruiting stocks when mobile anglers interact with spatially structured resource patches.  
948 As mentioned before, Mee et al. (2016) reported that mobile anglers targeting stocked  
949 rainbow trout in British Columbia quickly fish down stock-enhanced population to some

950 regional level “fishing quality” dictated by distance-clustered number (catch)-size trade-offs  
951 for fishing quality. Similarly, in our model where the disutility of distance and the catch  
952 preferences of anglers were endogenous for the angler movement dynamic, we found that  
953 variation in lake qualities by varying the carrying capacity among lakes did not maintain  
954 variation in catch rates when the angler population size was large. In naturally recruited  
955 species elevation of the carrying capacity can only be achieved by either improvements to  
956 habitats (which is rarely implemented in practice) or through the successful stocking of  
957 usually recruited (i.e., large) fishes leading to put-and-take type of fisheries (Arlinghaus et al.,  
958 2015; Camp et al., 2017; Rogers et al., 2010; Ziegler et al., 2017). Such type of manipulation  
959 of the general availability of fishes to capture (conceptually represented by an elevated  
960 carrying capacity) is, however, not expected to have long-term effects as dynamic angling  
961 effort quickly uses any locally available utility and moves lake-specific utilities to a regional  
962 average utility offered by all lakes in the landscape. By contrast, elevating the slope of the  
963 stock-recruitment curve, for example by habitat enhancement, has been shown in our work to  
964 maintain variation in angling qualities in the region and thus could be a superior long-term  
965 strategy, knowing that variation elevates the resiliency of exploited systems (Carpenter et al.,  
966 2015). Further models on the systematic effects of stocking vs. other management options are  
967 needed because we did not explicitly model stocking in our model.  
968

969 **Conclusions**

970 We found that social and economic outcomes to be expected as emergent properties from a  
971 pool of anglers interacting with a spatially structured lake system were strongly driven by the  
972 particular spatial configuration, angler population size in relation to available lake areas and  
973 angler and lake heterogeneity. Simplification of any of these ingredients will impair the ability  
974 to predict the geographic configuration of key outcomes of interest, such as the degree of  
975 local and regional overexploitation, the angler effort attracted to specific fisheries and the  
976 well-being of fishers generated by a freshwater landscape as a whole. At the same time we  
977 also found that if one is only interested in understanding overall regional outcomes,  
978 simplification of spatial configurations and lake heterogeneity may not be overly  
979 consequential. By contrast, simplification of angler heterogeneity will lead to large biases at  
980 best, and mismanagement and stock collapses at worst. Social-ecological landscape models  
981 are one tool to systematically examine how spatial and angler heterogeneity interact with  
982 regulations to produce regional-level outcomes. Models such as ours can be an important  
983 research tool to conduct “virtual ecologist” experiments to design optimal sampling strategies  
984 and test management strategies in the framework of uncertainties using a management  
985 strategy evaluation framework (e.g., Deroba & Bence, 2008; Thébaud et al., 2014; Wilberg et  
986 al., 2008). Future work is needed engaging in multi-criteria optimization (by accounting for  
987 multiple objectives both conservation and angler well-being oriented) and how to put a  
988 landscape perspective into operation in light of severe limitations in monitoring abilities in

989 data-poor situations (Fayram et al., 2009; Lester et al., 2014).

990

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995

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Table 1. Equations of biological and angling processes of the pike population model (from Arlinghaus et al., 2009). Parameter values and their sources are listed in Table 2.

Equations	Descriptions
<b>Biological processes</b>	
1 $\begin{cases} L_a = \frac{3}{3 + g_{a-1}} (L_{a-1} + h) \\ L_1 = h(1 - t_1) \end{cases}$	Length $L$ of fish at age $a$ . $g_a = 0$ for immature pike ( $a < a_M$ ), while $g_a = g$ (constant) for mature pike.
2 $W_a = \delta_1 (L_a / L_u)^{\delta_2}$	Length-weight relationship.
3 $D = \sum_{a=1}^{a_{\max}} N_a W_a$	Biomass density.
4 $h = \frac{h_{\max}}{1 + \phi_1 (D / D_u)^{\phi_2}}$	Density-dependent growth.
5 $f_a = \frac{G_a}{2W_e} \exp(-\rho D)$	Density-dependent fecundity.
6 $G_a = \frac{g_a W_a}{\omega}$	Gonad weight.
7 $N_L = \sum_{a=1}^{a_{\max}} \psi N_a f_a$	Numerical density of larvae.
8 $N_1 / N_L = \alpha \exp(-\beta N_L)$	First year survival probability (from larvae to recruits, i.e., age 1 fish). See the main text for further explanations.
9 $s_{1/2,a} = \frac{\exp(\tau_0 + \tau_X X + \tau_Y Y + \tau_L L_a)}{1 + \exp(\tau_0 + \tau_X X + \tau_Y Y + \tau_L L_a)}$	Density- and size-dependent half-year survival probability. $X$ and $Y$ are numerical densities of “small” and “large” pike, respectively. The survival probability differs between “small” and “large” pike (motivating different parameter values). We defined “small” as 2-year-old, and “large” as 3-year-old or older. Note that we found an error in our earlier application of density-dependent natural mortality in Appendix A of



Arlinghaus et al. (2009), which we corrected here by exactly following the empirically derived functions from Haugen et al. (2007).

### Angling processes

$$10 \quad k_a = \begin{cases} V_a[1 - \exp(-qA)] & \text{(if fish are recognized as legal)} \\ V_a[1 - \exp(-qAR)] & \text{(if fish are recognized as undersized)} \end{cases}$$

Annual fishing mortality.  $q$  and  $A$  represent the catchability coefficient and annual angling effort density, respectively.

$$11 \quad V_a = [1 - \exp(-\eta_1 L_a)]^{\eta_2}$$

Size-dependent vulnerability to angling.

$$12 \quad P_{\text{Leg},a} = 1 / \{1 + \exp[\gamma(L_a - L_{\text{MLL}}) / L_{\text{MLL}}]\}$$

Probability that fish of size  $L_a$  is recognized as legal.  $L_{\text{MLL}}$  is the minimum-length limit.

$$13 \quad R = \theta + Q - \theta Q$$

Coefficient related to mortality of undersized fish due to catch-and-release.

$$14 \quad Q(t+1) = \varepsilon_1 (C_r(t) / C_u)^{-\varepsilon_2}$$

Proportion of undersized fish harvested illegally.  $C_r$  is the catch rate of undersized fish.

$$15 \quad P_x = \frac{(K+x-1)!}{x!(K-1)!} \left( \frac{m}{m+K} \right)^x \left( 1 + \frac{m}{K} \right)^{-K}$$

Probability of catching  $x$  fish in an average fishing trip.  $m$  is the expected catch per trip.  $K = m^2 / (\sigma^2 - m)$  is a measure of heterogeneity about the mean, where  $\sigma^2$  is the variance in catch among trips.

### Angler effort dynamics and welfare estimate

$$16 \quad U_{i,j} = U_{0,i,j} + U_{\text{catch},i,j} + U_{\text{size},i,j} + U_{\text{crowd},i,j} + U_{\text{status},i,j} + U_{\text{regulation},i,j} + U_{\text{cost},i,j} + U_{\text{distance},i,j}$$

Utility of lake  $j$  for an angler of type  $i$  (where  $U_{0,i,j}$  is the basic utility gained

from fishing in the region,  $U_{\text{catch},i,j}$  is the PWU of catch rate,  $U_{\text{size},i,j}$  is the PWU of

maximum size of fish caught,  $U_{\text{crowd},i,j}$  is the PWU of angler crowding,  $U_{\text{status},i,j}$  is

the PWU of stock status,  $U_{\text{regulation},i,j}$  is the PWU of harvest regulations,  $U_{\text{cost},i,j}$  is

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the PWU of annual license cost, and  $U_{\text{distance},i,j}$  is the PWU of distance).

$$17 \quad P_{i,j} = \frac{\frac{4}{121} \exp(U_{i,j})}{\frac{4}{121} \left[ \sum_{k=1}^{121} \exp(U_{i,k}) \right] + \exp(U_{i,\text{Out}}) + \exp(U_{i,\text{NA}})}$$

Probability that an angler of type  $i$  chooses a lake  $j$ .

$$18 \quad Z_i = \frac{\ln\left(\frac{4}{121} \sum_{k=1}^{121} \exp(U_{0,i,k})\right) - \ln\left(\frac{4}{121} \sum_{k=1}^{121} \exp(U_{1,i,k})\right)}{\lambda_{\text{cost}}}$$

Change in WTP associated with the management change from the base scenario to an alternative scenario for an angler of the type  $i$ .  $U_{0,i,k}$  and  $U_{1,i,k}$  are the utilities of the lake  $k$  for an angler of the type  $i$  under the base scenario 0 and the alternative scenario 1, respectively.  $\lambda_{\text{cost}}$  is the linear slope for the cost variable.

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Table 2. Parameters and parameter values of biological and angling processes.

Symbol		Equation	Value	Unit	Source
<b>Biological processes</b>					
$g$	annual reproductive investment	1	0.45	–	Matsumura et al., 2011
$h$	annual juvenile growth increment (initial value)	1	16.725	cm	Arlinghaus et al., 2010
$a_M$	age at maturation (onset of reproductive investment)	–	2	yr	Raat, 1988
$t_1$	(growth trajectory)	1	-0.423	–	Arlinghaus et al., 2010
$\delta_1$	(length-weight relationship)†	2	$4.8 \times 10^{-6}$	kg	Willis 1989
$\delta_2$	(length-weight relationship)	2	3.059	–	Willis 1989
$L_u$	–	2	1	cm	unit standardizing factor
$a_{max}$	maximum age	3	11	yr	Raat, 1988
$\phi_1$	(density-dependent growth)	4	0.18190	–	Arlinghaus et al., 2010
$\phi_2$	(density-dependent growth)	4	0.56783	–	Arlinghaus et al., 2010
$h_{max}$	maximum annual juvenile growth increment	4	27.094	cm	Arlinghaus et al., 2010
$D_u$	–	4	1	kg ha <sup>-1</sup>	unit standardizing factor
$\rho$	(density-dependent relative fecundity)	5	0.04818	ha kg <sup>-1</sup>	Craig & Kipling, 1983
$W_e$	egg weight	5	$6.37 \times 10^{-6}$	kg	Arlinghaus et al., 2009
$\omega$	relative caloric density of eggs compared to soma	6	1.22	–	Diana, 1983
$\psi$	(hatching rate)	7	0.735	–	Franklin & Smith, 1963
$\alpha$	(stock-recruitment relationship, mean value)	8	$1.71 \times 10^{-4}$	–	Minns et al., 1996
$\beta$	(stock-recruitment relationship, the mean value)	8	$7.0 \times 10^{-6}$	–	Minns et al., 1996
$\tau_0$	(natural mortality)	9	2.37 (small pike), 1.555 (large pike)	–	Haugen et al., 2007
$\tau_x$	(natural mortality)	9	-0.02 (small pike),	–	Haugen et al., 2007

$\tau_Y$	(natural mortality)	9	0.40 (large pike), -0.29 (small pike), -0.88 (large pike)	–	Haugen et al., 2007
$\tau_L$	(natural mortality)	9	0.25 (small pike), 0.00 (large pike)	–	Haugen et al., 2007
<b>Angling processes</b>					
$q$	catchability	10	0.01431	ha h <sup>-1</sup>	Arlinghaus et al., 2010
$\eta_1$	(vulnerability)	11	0.25	cm <sup>-1</sup>	Arlinghaus et al., 2010
$\eta_2$	(vulnerability)	11	1300	–	Arlinghaus et al., 2010
$\gamma$	(illegal fish recognition)	12	-29.44	–	assumed
$\theta$	hooking mortality	13	0.094	–	Muoneke & Childress (1994)
$\varepsilon_1$	(non-compliance mortality)	14	1.25	–	Sullivan, 2002
$\varepsilon_2$	(non-compliance mortality)	14	-0.84	–	Sullivan, 2002
$C_u$	–	14	1	fish h <sup>-1</sup>	unit standardizing factor

† When symbol names are parenthesized, the symbols are parameters in a certain relationship. For example, (length-weight relationship) means that the symbol represents a parameter in the length-weight relationship.

Table 3. Parameter estimates of the latent class preference model for anglers estimated from the choice data presented in Beardmore et al., (2013). Values which are not underlined represent the slope of the PWU (part worth utility) functions, while underlined values represent constants. SD = standard deviation, refers to the standard deviation of data collected from diaries in the study region that were used when standardizing the attribute levels in the original choice experiment. For details on the interpretation of the four angler types, see supporting information.

Attribute	Type	Unit	4-class model				1-class model
			$\lambda$				$\lambda$
			Type 1	Type 2	Type 3	Type 4	(%)
			51.4	22.9	16.6	9.1	100.0
Intercept	Nominal	Fish in the region	<u>0.9149</u>	<u>0.1883</u>	<u>-0.5628</u>	<u>-0.4228</u>	<u>0.0900</u>
		Fish outside region	<u>-0.2386</u>	<u>-1.0336</u>	<u>-1.1146</u>	<u>1.1449</u>	<u>-0.4637</u>
		Not fish at all	<u>-0.6763</u>	<u>0.8453</u>	<u>1.6774</u>	<u>-0.7221</u>	<u>0.3737</u>
Catch rate	Numeric	SD from mean	0.1760	0.2337	0.4546	0.2776	0.2040
		Parameter 1 ( $\gamma_1$ ) <sup>†1</sup>	4.1162	2.8245	1.2646	2.1866	3.3395
		Parameter 2 ( $\gamma_2$ ) <sup>†1</sup>	2.6299	2.7162	7.7092	3.1479	2.6687
		Parameter 3 ( $\gamma_3$ ) <sup>†1</sup>	-0.6834	-0.9623	-8.6992	-1.4658	-0.8141
Maximum size <sup>†2</sup>	Numeric	SD from mean	0.1458	0.1482	0.1699	0.1997	0.1324
Anglers seen <sup>†3</sup>	Numeric	SD from mean	-0.0615	-0.1216	-0.0982	-0.1188	-0.0929
Stock status <sup>†4</sup>	Nominal	No information	<u>0.0821</u>	<u>0.0940</u>	<u>-0.0225</u>	<u>0.1580</u>	<u>0.0674</u>
		Good	<u>0.3087</u>	<u>0.3614</u>	<u>0.5258</u>	<u>0.2674</u>	<u>0.3203</u>
		Lightly overfished	<u>-0.0609</u>	<u>-0.0452</u>	<u>0.1618</u>	<u>-0.0961</u>	<u>-0.0338</u>
		Overfished	<u>-0.3299</u>	<u>-0.4102</u>	<u>-0.6651</u>	<u>-0.3293</u>	<u>-0.3539</u>
Regulations <sup>†5</sup>	Nominal	None	<u>-0.1660</u>	<u>-0.0544</u>	<u>-0.0675</u>	<u>-0.5259</u>	<u>-0.1307</u>
		Light	<u>0.1462</u>	<u>0.0570</u>	<u>0.0657</u>	<u>0.4538</u>	<u>0.1604</u>
		Medium	<u>0.0937</u>	<u>0.1020</u>	<u>0.2497</u>	<u>0.1268</u>	<u>0.0799</u>

		Strict	<u>-0.0738</u>	<u>-0.1047</u>	<u>-0.2479</u>	<u>-0.0547</u>	<u>-0.1097</u>
Licence cost	Numeric	10 € increment	-0.0212	-0.0981	-0.1501	-0.1251	-0.0621
Distance	Numeric	20 km increment	-0.0558	-0.5212	-1.6055	-0.2627	-0.1293

†1: Parameters for the PWU non-linear function, see supporting information for details. †2: Maximum size of fish captured is defined as the 95th percentile of the size distribution of fish caught annually. †3: All anglers at a particular lake are assumed to see each other because of the small size of lakes (10 ha). †4: In the present study, the level “none” (no information present) was chosen (see text for details). †5: The level "Medium" and "None" correspond to the "traditional harvest regulation" scenario (a minimum-length limit of 50 cm and a daily bag limit of 3 pike per angler day) and the "no regulation" scenario, respectively.

## Figure legends

Figure 1. Schematic overview of the model.

Figure 2. An example of the distribution of lake-specific angling effort in the homogeneous and heterogeneous landscapes with the presence of the one-size-fits all regulation in the rural and urban landscapes. Lakes are identical in the homogeneous landscape, while lakes differ in their productivity or carrying capacity in the heterogeneous landscape. The annual angling effort densities are:  $<30$ ,  $<60$ ,  $<90$ ,  $<120$ ,  $<150$ , and  $\geq 150$  [h ha<sup>-1</sup>].

Figure 3. An example of the spatial pattern of exploitation in the homogeneous and heterogeneous landscapes with the presence of the one-size-fits all regulation in the rural and urban landscapes. Lakes are identical in the homogeneous landscape, while lakes differ in their productivity or carrying capacity in the heterogeneous landscape. Lakes are categorized based on their relative spawning stock biomass (SSB) to their pristine SSB ( $SSB/SSB_0$ ). Green: healthy (0.35 or higher), yellow: overfished (between 0.35 and 0.10), red: collapsed (less than 0.10). pAED is potential annual angling effort density [h ha<sup>-1</sup>].

Figure 4. Comparison between the homogeneous (Homo) and heterogeneous (Hetero) landscapes. Lakes are identical in the homogeneous landscape, while lakes vary in their

productivity (top) or carrying capacity (bottom) in the heterogeneous landscape. Regional outcomes in terms of average lake-specific angling effort, degree of overexploitation of lakes (ROF = recruitment overfished stocks), biomass yield, and angler welfare as represented by average willingness-to-pay (WTP) per year in the rural and urban landscapes with the presence of the one-size-fits all harvest regulation are shown.

Figure 5. Comparison between the situations with or without the presence of the one-size-fits all harvest regulation in the rural and urban landscapes. Regional outcomes in terms of angling effort, overexploitation of lakes (ROF = recruitment overfished stocks), biomass yield, and angler welfare as represented by average willingness-to-pay (WTP) per year are shown. Lakes vary in their productivity (top) or carrying capacity (bottom).

Figure 6. Comparison between the 4-class heterogeneous (Hetero) and 1-class homogeneous (Homo) angler models in the rural and urban landscapes. Regional outcomes in angling effort, overexploitation of lakes (ROF = recruitment overfished lakes), biomass yield and angler welfare as represented by average willingness-to-pay (WTP) per year with the presence of the on-size-fits all harvest regulation are shown. Lakes vary in their productivity (top) or carrying capacity (bottom).



Figure 7. Proportions of each angler class within the realised angling effort density (AED, angling-h  $ha^{-1}$ ) in the urban case with the presence of the one-size-fits all harvest regulation. Lakes vary in their productivity. Lakes are categorized by the distance from the metropolis: Zone 1 (<28 km), 2 (<56 km) 3 (<84 km) and 4 ( $\geq$ 84 km). The original proportion of the angler classes is shown on the left.

Figure 8. Relationship between a lake's intrinsic quality (pristine  $SSB = SSB_0$ ) and the degree of exploitation (represented by  $SSB/SSB_0$ ) and average angler catch rates (pike per hour) at equilibrium with the presence of the one-size-fits all harvest regulation in a rural landscape. Each lake is represented by a circle. Variation among lakes in their pristine  $SSB$  arises either from variation in their productivity (a) or carrying capacity (b). From the left to the right: potential pAED (annual angling effort density) = 50, 150, 250, and 350 [ $h\ ha^{-1}$ ].

Figure 9. Relationship between a lake's intrinsic quality (pristine  $SSB = SSB_0$ ) and the degree of exploitation (represented by  $SSB/SSB_0$ ) and average angler catch rates (pike per hour) at equilibrium with the presence of the one-size-fits all harvest regulation in an urban landscape. Each lake is represented by a circle. Variation among lakes in their pristine  $SSB$  arises either from variation in their productivity (a) or carrying capacity (b). From the left to the right: potential pAED (annual angling effort density) = 50, 150, 250, and 350 [ $h\ ha^{-1}$ ].




Fig. 1




Fig. 2




Fig. 3




Fig. 4




Fig. 5




Fig. 6




Fig. 7






Fig. 8




Fig. 9

## Appendix I

### Title:

Ecological, angler and spatial heterogeneity drive social and ecological outcomes in an integrated landscape model of freshwater recreational fisheries

### Authors:

Matsumura, S., Beardmore, B., Haider, W., Dieckmann, U., and Arlinghaus, R.

### Estimating a generic utility model for anglers

Most previous revealed or stated preferences models of anglers were directed at a particular target species (e.g., Dorow et al., 2010; Oh & Ditton, 2006,). Beardmore et al. (2013) presented a substantial innovation by generating stated choice data from a sample of anglers in northeastern Germany that exploited various fish species, including pike. However, different species differ in catch rates and other units of interest (e.g., size dimension), which complicates the standardized estimation of the relative importance of selected attributes across a range of species for angler choice. Beardmore et al. (2013) found a way of tailoring a stated preference discrete choice experiment to a random sample of anglers for which a previous diary survey indicated target species and variation in catch rates and captured sizes to be expected across species by individual respondents. The very same anglers were then confronted in a second survey with a stated choice experiment tailored to their specific target species, where the variation in levels of attributes describing choice option were made species independent by drawing levels for attributes such as catch rates or fish sizes in a standardized fashion across species, thereby varying levels in a comparable way related to species-specific means and standard deviations for attributes of interest. Thereby, the model generated species-independent estimates of the so-called part worth utilities of different attributes known to be important to anglers, both catch- and non-catch related. To our knowledge this is the most general representation of angler behaviour published so far and hence was chosen for our work. We used these preferences to simulate angler behaviour *in silico*.

In the choice experiment described in detail in Beardmore et al. (2013), randomly selected anglers drawn from fishing license holders in the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (M-V) were presented with a set of hypothetical angling experiences composed of several attributes including target fish species, licence cost, distance to the lake, catch number per trip (catch rate), average and maximum size of catch, number of anglers seen a measure of

crowding, minimum-length limit, daily bag limit and stock status. Each attribute was systematically varied to allow estimation of preferences for varying attribute levels. For each choice set, anglers were asked to allocate 10 days among six alternatives: four angling places in the region (i.e., M-V), angling outside the region, and no angling. Besides discrete choice tests, anglers were asked to answer a questionnaire concerning their angling activities during the last twelve months as well as their attitudes towards angling. Random utility theory (McFadden, 1973) assumes that individuals choose one alternative to another to maximize their utility, and the utility of one alternative is a function of its components, i.e., attributes (e.g., expected catch rate) and attribute levels (e.g., different catch rate levels). Based on the observed allocation of days among alternatives, we estimated the part-worth utility (PWU, a measure of importance) for attributes and attribute levels, i.e., the contributions of each attribute and attribute level to the overall utility of the alternative to the angler. We assumed that the PWU for each attribute was a linear function of attribute levels, and estimated the coefficient of the linear function similar to Beardmore et al. (2013). For further details of the choice experiment and its theoretical background, see Beardmore et al. (2013).

**Recreation specialization theory: a framework for understanding angler heterogeneity**  
Human dimensions researchers have long recognized that the “average angler” does not exist (Aas & Ditton, 1998; Shafer, 1969). In his seminal paper on recreation specialization, Bryan (1977) observed “a continuum of behaviour from the general to the particular, reflected by equipment and skills used in the sport and activity setting preferences” (p. 175) in American trout anglers, concluding that anglers may be grouped into types that share specific values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviours. While conceptualizations of specialization posited that as one gains experience in a recreational activity, one also becomes more emotionally involved or “specialized” (Ditton et al., 1992); however, the notion of clear predictable stages in an angling career being correlated with degree of specialization has been challenged (Scott & Shafer, 2001). That said, specialization is a multidimensional concept (Ditton et al., 1992), with clear correlates related to affective, cognitive and behavioural measures of attachment to the activity (Scott & Shafer, 2001). These measures reflect the degree to which one self-identifies with the activity (Scott & Shafer, 2001), one’s dedication to the values and norms of the social world of angling (Buchanan, 1985; Ditton et al., 1992), one’s level of expertise (Salz & Loomis, 2005), and one’s investment of time, money, and other resources to the activity (Ditton et al., 1992). While these three dimensions form the core of specialization theory, Bryan’s (1977) observation also relies on observations of heterogeneous “activity setting” preferences. Preference can be defined as an evaluative judgment in the sense of

liking or disliking an object or outcome (Scherer, 2005). Thus, specialized anglers may also be differentiated from one another by their individual preferences for certain fishing experiences to the exclusion of others. For example, in some fisheries, specialization may be associated with a shift in catch orientation (Anderson et al., 2007; Fedler & Ditton, 1986; Graefe, 1980) from a focus on number of fish towards size of fish; and/or a tendency to release more fish (Bryan, 1977; Salz & Loomis, 2005). In this sense, the concept of specialization may be applied to any segmentation of anglers based on preferences for particular fishing experiences. For example, one may refer to the “fly fisherman” (Bryan, 1977) or “specialized carp angler” (Arlinghaus & Mehner, 2003) as technique or species specialists, or the “trophy angler” (Arterburn et al., 2002) as someone whose behavior is primarily motivated by the outcome of catching a large fish (Fedler & Ditton, 1986, p. 198). While such species-, technique- or outcome- specific preferences may not be fully resolved using the generic model of angler preferences used in this study, specialization still provides a rich conceptual framework for incorporating angler heterogeneity into an examination of social-ecological interactions. We used latent class modelling (see main text) applied to the utility data to identify classes of anglers and investigated whether the angler types followed specialization levels.

One challenge associated with latent class analysis is that the probabilistic nature of the class assignment does not necessarily provide a clear picture of the archetypal member of each class (Beardmore et al., 2013). Examining the angler types identified by latent class analysis through the lens of recreation specialization, however, provided some insights that aided in this regard. For ease of understanding, Table S1 presents a qualitative rating of the relative PWU values among the four angler types for attributes included in the choice experiment, along with other indicators of specialization taken from the surveys, interviews and diaries completed by study participants (for details, see Beardmore et al. 2013; Dorow & Arlinghaus 2011).

Type 1 anglers were the least likely to choose choice alternatives other than fishing in the study region. They were the least averse to paying high license fees, as well as the most accepting of high travel distances to get to fishing destinations within the region. They were the most tolerant of fishing in sight of other anglers, and strict regulations. This group also derived the least utility from the number of fish harvested. The commitment to fishing under less than ideal conditions demonstrated by this group was consistent with their tendency to score highly on a centrality to lifestyle index (measuring the degree to which fishing is a core aspect of their identity and lifestyle, data not shown here), their self-assessment of their

fishing skill level, and their financial and travel investments into fishing in the region. These anglers therefore were considered to be highly specialized, fitting the label of “Committed anglers”.

Type 2 anglers and Type 3 anglers represented incremental decreases in specialization, with each of these types more likely to opt out of fishing the last. Of note is the apparently increasing importance of catch outcomes among these groups, indicating that perceptions of high fishing quality are necessary to overcome the propensity to pursue non-fishing activities. Type 2 and Type 3 anglers were therefore considered to exhibit moderate and low specialization levels, respectively, fitting the labels of active and casual anglers.

While the first three angler types represent a specialization continuum from committed to casual in their preferences and commitment to angling in the study region, Type 4 anglers presented a different breed. In their choice responses, Type 4 anglers demonstrated a strong preference for fishing outside the region, showed a medium aversion to license costs and travel within the region. They derived higher utility from larger fish. They considered themselves to be more skilled on average than did the other groups, but were similar to Type 2 in their centrality to lifestyle. On average they tended to travel farthest to fish, while paying less than other anglers for their regional licenses. On the other hand, they had the highest average investment in fishing equipment. On the whole, Type 4 anglers appeared less invested in fishing freshwaters in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; however, their commitment to fishing extended beyond the borders of the state with substantial investments in time and money to pursue their fishing activities. Consequently, one should consider these anglers as highly specialized (similar to Type 1 anglers) but with a greater emphasis on fishing elsewhere than in the study region.

### Calibration of the mechanistic angler model

The original choice model presented the levels of some attributes (in particular catch rates, the size of fish captured and the angler numbers seen while fishing) in a standardized and personalized fashion to remove scale and units issues different among species (Beardmore et al. 2013). This was done by varying the levels of the mentioned attributes around a species specific distribution in units of SD so that choice sets presented to respondents for species A and species B varied in the same fashion along species-specific characteristics (e.g., the same SD change in length of fish captured when a pike scenario was evaluated compared to a perch scenario, for example). To find means and SDs for the attributes Fish number, Maximum size, and Angler seen in our simulated virtual landscape and allow the calibration of Beardmore et

al.'s (2013) model, initial simulations were run assuming that anglers are distributed across the lakes to achieve the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of any one population. The resulting distribution of the three attribute levels at equilibrium across lakes were used to define the expected variation in the virtual landscape at optimal conditions and to compute means and SDs so that variation in catch rate, size and crowding all exerted effect on utility, and hence on lake choice.

For application of the choice model to our landscape, we modified the originally estimated linear PWU function for the utility effect of catch rates (fish numbers, Table S1). This was done because during preliminary simulations using the original functions given by Beardmore et al. (2013), we found that anglers also visited lakes where catch rates are zero. This unreasonable outcome arose from the fact that the original stated preference choice experiment did not include extremely low catch levels by design. Moreover, the extreme nonlinearities of the PWU function for fish catch reported in subsequent work by Arlinghaus et al. (2014) (i.e., infinitely low utility of zero catch and marginal diminishing returns as catch rates close some threshold level of one to two fish per day) could not be approximated by the original linear function fitted through five catch levels in the experiment by Beardmore et al. (2013). To avoid systematically overestimating the number of anglers at lakes present at even extremely low catch rates, we re-fitted logarithmic functions

$$PWU(x) = \log_{\gamma_1}(x + \gamma_2) + \gamma_3$$

through the PWU values predicted by the original functions at five levels of expected catch rates ( $x$ ), that is,  $\mu - 2.63\sigma$ ,  $\mu - 0.5\sigma$ ,  $\mu$ ,  $\mu + 1.0\sigma$ , and  $\mu + 3.76\sigma$ , where  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$  represent the mean and SD for catch rates at MSY, respectively. The first and last values correspond to actual catch rates that are zero and the maximum number of catch rates per angler possible in the region, respectively. Note that we standardized catch rate before calculating PWU, so the mean of the standardized catch rate is zero and the absolutely zero value for catch rate is negative on the standardized curve (Fig. S1). The PWU at the point of actual zero catch rate was determined to achieve a low probability of fishing of 6.3% when PWUs of all other attributes are zero. The probability value (6.3%) was chosen corresponding with angler diary data from anglers in M-V; it corresponds to the average percentage of trips taken by anglers who had average daily catch rates of zero. The modified functions are shown in Fig. S1, and the values of parameters  $\gamma_1$ ,  $\gamma_2$ , and  $\gamma_3$  are reported in Table S1. The functional form agreed with the diminishing marginal return of utility of catch rate expected from economic theory and reported for German anglers elsewhere (Arlinghaus et al. 2014). In Fig. S1 you can also see variation in angler types in how utility of catch rate changes with

increasing catch.

We also modified regulation-related attributes in Beardmore et al. (2013). We combined the original attributes "Minimum-size limit" and "Daily bag limit" and created a single attribute "Regulations", and estimated parameter values of the new PWU function.

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Table S1. Relative utility values across angler types and indicator variables associated with for classification by recreation specialization assessed from the choice model (see main text) and a qualitative assessment of differences among anglers in additional variables (cognitive and affective as well as behaviour) taken from the survey data (for details see Beardmore et al., 2013).

	<b>Type 1</b>	<b>Type 2</b>	<b>Type 3</b>	<b>Type 4</b>
<b>Attribute</b>				
Propensity to Fish	High (in region)	Medium	Low	High (Elsewhere)
Cost aversion	Very Low	Low	High	Medium
Travel aversion	Low	High	Very High	Medium
Utility from fish harvested	Low	Medium	High	Medium
Utility from max. size	Medium	Medium	Medium	High
Congestion aversion	Very Low	Medium	Low	Medium
Overfishing aversion	High	High	Medium	High
Regulation aversion	Low	Medium	High	Medium
<b>Cognitive and Affective commitment</b>				
Centrality to lifestyle (affective)	High	Medium	Low	Medium
Self-rated angling skill (cognitive)	Medium-High	Medium	Low	High
<b>Behavioral commitment</b>				
Average travel distance	High	Medium	Low	Very high
License expenditures in MV	High	High	Medium	Low
Average trips targeting pike (per year)	4.3	4.3	3.6	3.3
Equipment value (Euro)	1520	1120	913	1834
<b>Specialization label</b>	<b>Committed (in region)</b>	<b>Active</b>	<b>Casual</b>	<b>Committed (elsewhere)</b>




Fig. S1. Modified part worth utility (PWU) functions for standardized catch rate. The smallest value of the standardized catch rate corresponds to zero catch. Thick, dotted, dashed and thin lines correspond to the type 1, 2, 3, and 4 angler classes (Table S1), respectively.



## Appendix II

### Title:

Ecological, angler and spatial heterogeneity drive social and ecological outcomes in an integrated landscape model of freshwater recreational fisheries

### Authors:

Matsumura, S., Beardmore, B., Haider, W., Dieckmann, U., and Arlinghaus, R.




Figure S2. An example of the distribution of lake-specific angling effort in the homogeneous and heterogeneous landscapes in the absence of harvest regulations in the rural and urban landscape. Lakes are identical in the homogeneous landscape, while lakes differ in their productivity or carrying capacity in the heterogeneous landscape. The annual angling effort densities are:  $<30$ ,  $<60$ ,  $<90$ ,  $<120$ ,  $<150$ , and  $\geq 150$  [h ha<sup>-1</sup>].




Figure S3. An example of the spatial pattern of exploitation in the homogeneous and heterogeneous landscapes in the absence of harvest regulations in the rural and urban landscapes. Lakes are identical in the homogeneous landscape, while lakes differ in their productivity or carrying capacity in the heterogeneous landscape. Lakes are categorized based on their relative spawning stock biomass (SSB) to their pristine SSB ( $SSB/SSB_0$ ). Green: healthy (0.35 or higher), yellow: overfished (between 0.35 and 0.10), red: collapsed (less than 0.10). pAED is potential angling effort density [ $h\ ha^{-1}$ ].




Figure S4. Comparison between the homogeneous (Homo) and heterogeneous (Hetero) landscapes. Lakes are identical in the homogeneous landscape, while lakes vary in their productivity (top) or carrying capacity (bottom) in the heterogeneous landscape. Regional outcomes in terms of average lake-specific angling effort, degree of overexploitation of lakes (ROF = recruitment overfished stocks), biomass yield, and angler welfare as represented by average willingness-to-pay (WTP) per year in the rural and urban landscapes in the absence of harvest regulations are shown.






Figure S5. Comparison between the 4-class heterogeneous (Hetero) and 1-class homogeneous (Homo) angler models in the rural and urban landscapes. Regional outcomes in angling effort, overexploitation of lakes (ROF = recruitment overfished lakes), biomass yield and angler welfare as represented by average willingness-to-pay (WTP) per year in the absence of harvest regulations are shown. Lakes vary in their productivity (top) or carrying capacity (bottom).




Figure S6. Proportions of each angler class within the realised angling effort density (AED, angling-h ha<sup>-1</sup>) in the urban case in the absence of harvest regulations. Lakes vary in their productivity. Lakes are categorized by the distance from the metropolis: Zone 1 (<28 km), 2 (<56 km) 3 (<84 km) and 4 (≥84 km). The original proportion of the angler classes is shown on the left.




Figure S7. Relationship between a lake's intrinsic quality (pristine SSB =  $SSB_0$ ) and the degree of exploitation (represented by  $SSB/SSB_0$ ) and average angler catch rates (pike per hour) at equilibrium in the absence of harvest regulations in a rural landscape. Each lake is represented by a circle. Variation among lakes in their pristine SSB arises either from variation in their productivity (a) or carrying capacity (b). From the left to the right: potential pAED (annual angling effort density) = 50, 100, 150, or 200 [h ha<sup>-1</sup>].




Figure S8. Relationship between a lake's intrinsic quality (pristine SSB =  $SSB_0$ ) and the degree of exploitation (represented by  $SSB/SSB_0$ ) and average angler catch rates (pike per hour) at equilibrium in the absence of harvest regulations in an urban landscape. Each lake is represented by a circle. Variation among lakes in their pristine SSB arises either from variation in their productivity (a) or carrying capacity (b). From the left to the right: potential pAED (annual angling effort density) = 50, 100, 150, or 200 [ $h\ ha^{-1}$ ].




Figure S9. Relationship between the distance from the central lake and the degree of exploitation (represented by  $SSB/SSB_0$ ), the number of trips taken per year to each lake, and average angler catch rates (pike per hour) at equilibrium in the absence of harvest regulations in a rural landscape. Each lake is represented by a circle. Variation among lakes in their pristine SSB arises either from variation in their productivity (a) or carrying capacity (b). From the left to the right: potential AED (annual angling effort density) = 50, 100, 150, and 200 [ $h\ ha^{-1}$ ].




Figure S10. Relationship between the distance from the central lake and the degree of exploitation (represented by  $SSB/SSB_0$ ), the number of trips taken per year to each lake, and average angler catch rates (pike per hour) at equilibrium in the absence of harvest regulations in an urban landscape. Each lake is represented by a circle. Variation among lakes in their pristine SSB arises either from variation in their productivity (a) or carrying capacity (b). From the left to the right: potential AED (annual angling effort density) = 50, 100, 150, and 200 [ $h\ ha^{-1}$ ].




Figure S11. Relationship between the distance from the central lake and the degree of exploitation (represented by  $SSB/SSB_0$ ), the number of trips taken per year to each lake, and average angler catch rates (pike per hour) at equilibrium with the presence of the one-size-fits all harvest regulation in a rural landscape. Each lake is represented by a circle. Variation among lakes in their pristine SSB arises either from variation in their productivity (a) or carrying capacity (b). From the left to the right: potential AED (annual angling effort density) = 50, 150, 250, and 350 [ $h\ ha^{-1}$ ].




Figure S12. Relationship between the distance from the central lake and the degree of exploitation (represented by  $SSB/SSB_0$ ), the number of trips taken per year to each lake, and average angler catch rates (pike per hour) at equilibrium with the presence of the one-size-fits all harvest regulation in an urban landscape. Each lake is represented by a circle. Variation among lakes in their pristine SSB arises either from variation in their productivity (a) or carrying capacity (b). From the left to the right: potential AED (annual angling effort density) = 50, 150, 250, and 350 [ $h\ ha^{-1}$ ].