Oscillations in Optional Public Good Games

Hauert, C., De Monte, S., Sigmund, K., & Hofbauer, J. (2001). Oscillations in Optional Public Good Games. IIASA Interim Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-01-036

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Abstract

We present a new mechanism promoting cooperative behavior among selfish individuals in the public goods game. This game represents a straightforward generalization of the prisoner's dilemma to an arbitrary number of players. In contrast to the compulsory public goods game, optional participation provides a natural way to avoid deadlocks in the state of mutual defection. The three resulting strategies - collaboration or defection in the public goods game, as well as not joining at all -are studied by means of a replicator dynamics, which can be completely analysed in spite of the fact that some payoff terms are nonlinear. If cooperation is valuable enough, the dynamics exhibits a rock-scissors-paper type of cycling between the three strategies, leading to sizeable average levels of cooperation in the population. Thus, voluntary participation makes cooperation possible. But for each strategy, the average payoff value remains equal to the earnings of those not participating in the public goods game.

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