@article{iiasa13562,
          volume = {37},
          number = {1},
           month = {January},
           title = {Discretionary Profit in Subsidised Housing Markets},
         journal = {Urban Studies},
             doi = {10.1080/0042098002357},
           pages = {181--194},
            year = {2000},
             url = {https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/13562/},
            issn = {0042-0980},
        abstract = {In the subsidised housing sector, building corporations can use their market power as purchasers to raise output of subsidised housing to a level higher than it is with perfect competition on both sides of the market. This holds true if the building society is perfectly X-efficient. The proposition is not necessarily true if the corporation maximises a utility function in which discretionary profit, or organisational slack, is an argument. The X-inefficient building society may set output higher or lower than with perfect competition. If the government grants a fixed subsidy per house and tries to constrain X-inefficiency by imposing a maximum price, this might be an incentive for the building corporation to maintain a planned shortage of subsidised houses. However, housing shortages will be smaller and welfare possibly greater than it is with perfect competition. The existence of a perfectly competitive non-subsidised housing sector is for the building corporation an incentive to increase strategically the output of subsidised housing and reduce planned shortages; but it does not necessarily eliminate such shortages.},
          author = {Nentjes, A. and Sch{\"o}pp, W.}
}