"13562","8","archive","353",,,"disk0/00/01/35/62","2016-08-03 13:36:58","2021-08-27 17:27:33","2016-08-03 13:36:58","article",,,"show","","","1",,,"Nentjes","A.","","",,,"",,,,,"","","Discretionary Profit in Subsidised Housing Markets","pub","","","",,,"In the subsidised housing sector, building corporations can use their market power as purchasers to raise output of subsidised housing to a level higher than it is with perfect competition on both sides of the market. This holds true if the building society is perfectly X-efficient. The proposition is not necessarily true if the corporation maximises a utility function in which discretionary profit, or organisational slack, is an argument. The X-inefficient building society may set output higher or lower than with perfect competition. If the government grants a fixed subsidy per house and tries to constrain X-inefficiency by imposing a maximum price, this might be an incentive for the building corporation to maintain a planned shortage of subsidised houses. However, housing shortages will be smaller and welfare possibly greater than it is with perfect competition. The existence of a perfectly competitive non-subsidised housing sector is for the building corporation an incentive to increase strategically the output of subsidised housing and reduce planned shortages; but it does not necessarily eliminate such shortages.","2000-01","published",,"10.1080/0042098002357",,,,,,"",,,,,"",,,,,"",,,,,"","",,"",,,,,,,"273","none",,,,"Urban Studies","37","1",,"181-194",,,,,,,,,,,"TRUE",,"0042-0980",,,,,,"","","","",,"","",,,,,,,"",,,,,"FALSE","no",,"info:eu-repo/semantics/article",
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