<mets:mets OBJID="eprint_13562" LABEL="Eprints Item" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/METS/ http://www.loc.gov/standards/mets/mets.xsd http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-3.xsd" xmlns:mets="http://www.loc.gov/METS/" xmlns:mods="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"><mets:metsHdr CREATEDATE="2024-01-01T22:08:41Z"><mets:agent ROLE="CUSTODIAN" TYPE="ORGANIZATION"><mets:name>IIASA Repository</mets:name></mets:agent></mets:metsHdr><mets:dmdSec ID="DMD_eprint_13562_mods"><mets:mdWrap MDTYPE="MODS"><mets:xmlData><mods:titleInfo><mods:title>Discretionary Profit in Subsidised Housing Markets</mods:title></mods:titleInfo><mods:name type="personal"><mods:namePart type="given">A.</mods:namePart><mods:namePart type="family">Nentjes</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:name type="personal"><mods:namePart type="given">W.</mods:namePart><mods:namePart type="family">Schöpp</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:abstract>In the subsidised housing sector, building corporations can use their market power as purchasers to raise output of subsidised housing to a level higher than it is with perfect competition on both sides of the market. This holds true if the building society is perfectly X-efficient. The proposition is not necessarily true if the corporation maximises a utility function in which discretionary profit, or organisational slack, is an argument. The X-inefficient building society may set output higher or lower than with perfect competition. If the government grants a fixed subsidy per house and tries to constrain X-inefficiency by imposing a maximum price, this might be an incentive for the building corporation to maintain a planned shortage of subsidised houses. However, housing shortages will be smaller and welfare possibly greater than it is with perfect competition. The existence of a perfectly competitive non-subsidised housing sector is for the building corporation an incentive to increase strategically the output of subsidised housing and reduce planned shortages; but it does not necessarily eliminate such shortages.</mods:abstract><mods:originInfo><mods:dateIssued encoding="iso8601">2000-01</mods:dateIssued></mods:originInfo><mods:genre>Article</mods:genre></mets:xmlData></mets:mdWrap></mets:dmdSec><mets:amdSec ID="TMD_eprint_13562"><mets:rightsMD ID="rights_eprint_13562_mods"><mets:mdWrap MDTYPE="MODS"><mets:xmlData><mods:useAndReproduction>
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