@prefix epid: <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/> .
  @prefix void: <http://rdfs.org/ns/void#> .
  @prefix xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> .
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  @prefix ep: <http://eprints.org/ontology/> .
  @prefix eprel: <http://eprints.org/relation/> .
  @prefix doi: <https://doi.org/> .
  @prefix dc: <http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/> .
  @prefix bibo: <http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/> .
  @prefix geo: <http://www.w3.org/2003/01/geo/wgs84_pos#> .
  @prefix owl: <http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#> .
  @prefix event: <http://purl.org/NET/c4dm/event.owl#> .
  @prefix skos: <http://www.w3.org/2004/02/skos/core#> .
  @prefix foaf: <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/> .
  @prefix rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#> .
  @prefix rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> .
  @prefix dct: <http://purl.org/dc/terms/> .

<>
	foaf:primaryTopic <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/13562>;
	rdfs:comment "The repository administrator has not yet configured an RDF license."^^xsd:string .

<https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/13562#authors>
	rdf:_1 <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/person/ext-714ad681263976b57523daf11311e6ba>;
	rdf:_2 <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/person/ext-1017> .

<https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/13562/>
	dc:format "text/html";
	dc:title "HTML Summary of #13562 \n\nDiscretionary Profit in Subsidised Housing Markets\n\n";
	foaf:primaryTopic <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/13562> .

<https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/13562>
	bibo:abstract "In the subsidised housing sector, building corporations can use their market power as purchasers to raise output of subsidised housing to a level higher than it is with perfect competition on both sides of the market. This holds true if the building society is perfectly X-efficient. The proposition is not necessarily true if the corporation maximises a utility function in which discretionary profit, or organisational slack, is an argument. The X-inefficient building society may set output higher or lower than with perfect competition. If the government grants a fixed subsidy per house and tries to constrain X-inefficiency by imposing a maximum price, this might be an incentive for the building corporation to maintain a planned shortage of subsidised houses. However, housing shortages will be smaller and welfare possibly greater than it is with perfect competition. The existence of a perfectly competitive non-subsidised housing sector is for the building corporation an incentive to increase strategically the output of subsidised housing and reduce planned shortages; but it does not necessarily eliminate such shortages."^^xsd:string;
	bibo:authorList <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/13562#authors>;
	bibo:issue "1";
	bibo:status <http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/status/peerReviewed>,
		<http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/status/published>;
	bibo:volume "37";
	dct:creator <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/person/ext-714ad681263976b57523daf11311e6ba>,
		<https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/person/ext-1017>;
	dct:date "2000-01";
	dct:isPartOf <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/repository>,
		<https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/publication/ext-00420980>;
	dct:title "Discretionary Profit in Subsidised Housing Markets"^^xsd:string;
	owl:sameAs <https://doi.org/10.1080/0042098002357>;
	rdf:type bibo:AcademicArticle,
		bibo:Article,
		ep:ArticleEPrint,
		ep:EPrint;
	rdfs:seeAlso <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/13562/> .

<https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/person/ext-714ad681263976b57523daf11311e6ba>
	foaf:familyName "Nentjes"^^xsd:string;
	foaf:givenName "A."^^xsd:string;
	foaf:name "A. Nentjes"^^xsd:string;
	rdf:type foaf:Person .

<https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/person/ext-1017>
	foaf:familyName "Schöpp"^^xsd:string;
	foaf:givenName "W."^^xsd:string;
	foaf:name "W. Schöpp"^^xsd:string;
	rdf:type foaf:Person .

<https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/publication/ext-00420980>
	bibo:issn "00420980";
	foaf:name "Urban Studies"^^xsd:string;
	owl:sameAs <urn:issn:00420980>;
	rdf:type bibo:Collection .