eprintid: 13562 rev_number: 8 eprint_status: archive userid: 353 dir: disk0/00/01/35/62 datestamp: 2016-08-03 13:36:58 lastmod: 2021-08-27 17:27:33 status_changed: 2016-08-03 13:36:58 type: article metadata_visibility: show item_issues_count: 1 creators_name: Nentjes, A. creators_name: Schöpp, W. creators_id: 1017 creators_orcid: 0000-0001-5990-423X title: Discretionary Profit in Subsidised Housing Markets ispublished: pub abstract: In the subsidised housing sector, building corporations can use their market power as purchasers to raise output of subsidised housing to a level higher than it is with perfect competition on both sides of the market. This holds true if the building society is perfectly X-efficient. The proposition is not necessarily true if the corporation maximises a utility function in which discretionary profit, or organisational slack, is an argument. The X-inefficient building society may set output higher or lower than with perfect competition. If the government grants a fixed subsidy per house and tries to constrain X-inefficiency by imposing a maximum price, this might be an incentive for the building corporation to maintain a planned shortage of subsidised houses. However, housing shortages will be smaller and welfare possibly greater than it is with perfect competition. The existence of a perfectly competitive non-subsidised housing sector is for the building corporation an incentive to increase strategically the output of subsidised housing and reduce planned shortages; but it does not necessarily eliminate such shortages. date: 2000-01 date_type: published id_number: 10.1080/0042098002357 creators_browse_id: 273 full_text_status: none publication: Urban Studies volume: 37 number: 1 pagerange: 181-194 refereed: TRUE issn: 0042-0980 coversheets_dirty: FALSE fp7_project: no fp7_type: info:eu-repo/semantics/article citation: Nentjes, A. & Schöpp, W. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5990-423X (2000). Discretionary Profit in Subsidised Housing Markets. Urban Studies 37 (1) 181-194. 10.1080/0042098002357 .