eprintid: 13857
rev_number: 10
eprint_status: archive
userid: 5
dir: disk0/00/01/38/57
datestamp: 2016-10-03 09:40:07
lastmod: 2021-08-27 17:27:50
status_changed: 2016-10-03 09:40:07
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
item_issues_count: 1
creators_name: Wrzaczek, S.
creators_name: Kaplan, E.H.
creators_name: Caulkins, J.P.
creators_name: Seidl, A.
creators_name: Feichtinger, G.
creators_id: 1555
title: Differential Terror Queue Games
ispublished: pub
divisions: prog_asa
keywords: counter-terrorism; differential games;queues; intelligence
abstract: We present models of differential terror queue games, wherein terrorists seek to determine optimal attack rates over time, while simultaneously the government develops optimal counterterror staffing levels. The number of successful and interdicted terror attacks is determined via an underlying dynamic terror queue model. Different information structures and commitment abilities derive from different assumptions regarding what the players in the game can and cannot deduce about the underlying model. We compare and explain the impact of different information structures, i.e., open loop, closed loop, and asymmetric. We characterize the optimal controls for both the terrorists and the government in terms of the associated state and costate variables and deduce the costate equations that must be solved numerically to yield solutions to the game for the different cases. Using recently assembled data describing both terror attack and staffing levels, we compare the differential game models to each other as well as to the optimal control model of Seidl et al. (Eur J Oper Res 248:246–256, 2016). The paper concludes with a discussion of the lessons learned from the entire modeling exercise.
date: 2017-12-01
date_type: published
publisher: Springer USA
id_number: 10.1007/s13235-016-0195-1
creators_browse_id: 2589
full_text_status: none
publication: Dynamic Games and Applications
volume: 7
number: 4
pagerange: 578-593
refereed: TRUE
issn: 2153-0785
funders: This research was supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under Grants P25979-N25 and P25275-G11
coversheets_dirty: FALSE
fp7_project: no
fp7_type: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
citation:   Wrzaczek, S., Kaplan, E.H., Caulkins, J.P., Seidl, A., & Feichtinger, G. <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/view/iiasa/2589.html>  (2017).  Differential Terror Queue Games.   Dynamic Games and Applications 7 (4) 578-593. 10.1007/s13235-016-0195-1 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-016-0195-1>.