@incollection{iiasa14042,
       booktitle = {Applied Game Theory},
          editor = {S.J. Brams and A. Schotter and G. Schw{\"o}diauer},
         address = {Germany},
           title = {Exploitable Surplus in N-Person Games},
       publisher = {Physica-Verlag HD},
             doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6\_2},
           pages = {32--38},
            year = {1979},
             url = {https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/14042/},
            isbn = {978-3-662-41501-6},
        abstract = {Any cooperative n-person game with transferable utility has a noncooperative mode in which the players sell out of their positions to an external market of entrepreneurial organizing agents. Assuming a market of price takers, this game of competitive self-valuation always has an equilibrium price solution. Every core imputation in the original game constitutes a set of equilibrium prices. If there is no core the entrepreneurs can exploit the coalitions for a profit, i.e., they realize a positive rent for their organizing function. Application is made to determining fair wages to labor, and finding equilibrium prices for legislators selling their votes.},
          author = {Young, H. P.}
}