"14042","6","archive","5",,,"disk0/00/01/40/42","2016-12-01 10:29:37","2021-08-27 17:28:09","2016-12-01 10:29:37","book_section",,,"show","","","2",,,"Young","H.P.","","","AL1397","","",,,,,"","","Exploitable Surplus in N-Person Games","pub","","","","",,"Any cooperative n-person game with transferable utility has a noncooperative mode in which the players sell out of their positions to an external market of entrepreneurial organizing agents. Assuming a market of price takers, this game of competitive self-valuation always has an equilibrium price solution. Every core imputation in the original game constitutes a set of equilibrium prices. If there is no core the entrepreneurs can exploit the coalitions for a profit, i.e., they realize a positive rent for their organizing function. Application is made to determining fair wages to labor, and finding equilibrium prices for legislators selling their votes.","1979","published","Physica-Verlag HD","10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2",,,,,,"",,,,,"",,,,,"",,,,,"","",,"",,,,,,,"2539","none",,,,,,,"Germany","32-38",,,,,,,,,,,"TRUE","978-3-662-41501-6",,"Applied Game Theory","Brams","S.J.","","","","","","",,"","",,,,,,,"",,,,,"FALSE",,,"info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart",
"14042",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Schotter","A.","","",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
"14042",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Schwödiauer","G.","","",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,