relation: https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/14042/
title: Exploitable Surplus in N-Person Games
creator: Young, H.P.
description: Any cooperative n-person game with transferable utility has a noncooperative mode in which the players sell out of their positions to an external market of entrepreneurial organizing agents. Assuming a market of price takers, this game of competitive self-valuation always has an equilibrium price solution. Every core imputation in the original game constitutes a set of equilibrium prices. If there is no core the entrepreneurs can exploit the coalitions for a profit, i.e., they realize a positive rent for their organizing function. Application is made to determining fair wages to labor, and finding equilibrium prices for legislators selling their votes.
publisher: Physica-Verlag HD
contributor: Brams, S.J.
contributor: Schotter, A.
contributor: Schwödiauer, G.
date: 1979
type: Book Section
type: PeerReviewed
identifier:   Young, H.P. <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/view/iiasa/2539.html>  (1979).  Exploitable Surplus in N-Person Games.    In:  Applied Game Theory. Eds. Brams, S.J., Schotter, A., & Schwödiauer, G., pp. 32-38 Germany: Physica-Verlag HD.  ISBN 978-3-662-41501-6 10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2 <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2>.     
relation: 10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2
identifier: 10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2
doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2