https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/14042 2021-08-27T17:28:09Z info:eu-repo/semantics/descriptiveMetadata https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/14042/ Exploitable Surplus in N-Person Games Young, H.P. Any cooperative n-person game with transferable utility has a noncooperative mode in which the players sell out of their positions to an external market of entrepreneurial organizing agents. Assuming a market of price takers, this game of competitive self-valuation always has an equilibrium price solution. Every core imputation in the original game constitutes a set of equilibrium prices. If there is no core the entrepreneurs can exploit the coalitions for a profit, i.e., they realize a positive rent for their organizing function. Application is made to determining fair wages to labor, and finding equilibrium prices for legislators selling their votes. Physica-Verlag HD Brams, S.J. Schotter, A. Schwödiauer, G. 1979 Book Section PeerReviewed Young, H.P. <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/view/iiasa/2539.html> (1979). Exploitable Surplus in N-Person Games. In: Applied Game Theory. Eds. Brams, S.J., Schotter, A., & Schwödiauer, G., pp. 32-38 Germany: Physica-Verlag HD. ISBN 978-3-662-41501-6 10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2 <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2>. 10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2 10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2 10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2 info:eu-repo/semantics/humanStartPage