IIASA RepositoryExploitable Surplus in N-Person GamesH.P.YoungauthorAny cooperative n-person game with transferable utility has a noncooperative mode in which the players sell out of their positions to an external market of entrepreneurial organizing agents. Assuming a market of price takers, this game of competitive self-valuation always has an equilibrium price solution. Every core imputation in the original game constitutes a set of equilibrium prices. If there is no core the entrepreneurs can exploit the coalitions for a profit, i.e., they realize a positive rent for their organizing function. Application is made to determining fair wages to labor, and finding equilibrium prices for legislators selling their votes.1979Physica-Verlag HDBook Section

For work being deposited by its own author: In self-archiving this collection of files and associated bibliographic metadata, I grant IIASA Repository the right to store them and to make them permanently available publicly for free on-line. I declare that this material is my own intellectual property and I understand that IIASA Repository does not assume any responsibility if there is any breach of copyright in distributing these files or metadata. (All authors are urged to prominently assert their copyright on the title page of their work.)

For work being deposited by someone other than its author: I hereby declare that the collection of files and associated bibliographic metadata that I am archiving at IIASA Repository) is in the public domain. If this is not the case, I accept full responsibility for any breach of copyright that distributing these files or metadata may entail.

Clicking on the deposit button indicates your agreement to these terms.