TY  - CHAP
CY  - Germany
ID  - iiasa14042
UR  - https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/14042/
A1  - Young, H.P.
Y1  - 1979///
N2  - Any cooperative n-person game with transferable utility has a noncooperative mode in which the players sell out of their positions to an external market of entrepreneurial organizing agents. Assuming a market of price takers, this game of competitive self-valuation always has an equilibrium price solution. Every core imputation in the original game constitutes a set of equilibrium prices. If there is no core the entrepreneurs can exploit the coalitions for a profit, i.e., they realize a positive rent for their organizing function. Application is made to determining fair wages to labor, and finding equilibrium prices for legislators selling their votes.
PB  - Physica-Verlag HD
SN  - 978-3-662-41501-6
ED  - Brams, S.J.
ED  - Schotter, A.
ED  - Schwödiauer, G.
TI  - Exploitable Surplus in N-Person Games
SP  - 32
AV  - none
EP  - 38
T2  - Applied Game Theory
ER  -