RT Book, Section
SR 00
ID 10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2
A1 Young, H.P.
T1 Exploitable Surplus in N-Person Games
YR 1979
FD 1979
SP 32
OP 38
AB Any cooperative n-person game with transferable utility has a noncooperative mode in which the players sell out of their positions to an external market of entrepreneurial organizing agents. Assuming a market of price takers, this game of competitive self-valuation always has an equilibrium price solution. Every core imputation in the original game constitutes a set of equilibrium prices. If there is no core the entrepreneurs can exploit the coalitions for a profit, i.e., they realize a positive rent for their organizing function. Application is made to determining fair wages to labor, and finding equilibrium prices for legislators selling their votes.
A2 Brams, S.J.
A2 Schotter, A.
A2 Schwödiauer, G.
T2 Applied Game Theory
PB Physica-Verlag HD
PP Germany
SN 978-3-662-41501-6
AV Published
LK https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/14042/