%A H.P. Young
%T Exploitable Surplus in N-Person Games
%X Any cooperative n-person game with transferable utility has a noncooperative mode in which the players sell out of their positions to an external market of entrepreneurial organizing agents. Assuming a market of price takers, this game of competitive self-valuation always has an equilibrium price solution. Every core imputation in the original game constitutes a set of equilibrium prices. If there is no core the entrepreneurs can exploit the coalitions for a profit, i.e., they realize a positive rent for their organizing function. Application is made to determining fair wages to labor, and finding equilibrium prices for legislators selling their votes.
%P 32-38
%B Applied Game Theory
%E S.J. Brams
%E A. Schotter
%E G. Schwödiauer
%C Germany
%D 1979
%R 10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2
%I Physica-Verlag HD
%L iiasa14042