eprintid: 14042
rev_number: 6
eprint_status: archive
userid: 5
dir: disk0/00/01/40/42
datestamp: 2016-12-01 10:29:37
lastmod: 2021-08-27 17:28:09
status_changed: 2016-12-01 10:29:37
type: book_section
metadata_visibility: show
item_issues_count: 2
creators_name: Young, H.P.
creators_id: AL1397
title: Exploitable Surplus in N-Person Games
ispublished: pub
abstract: Any cooperative n-person game with transferable utility has a noncooperative mode in which the players sell out of their positions to an external market of entrepreneurial organizing agents. Assuming a market of price takers, this game of competitive self-valuation always has an equilibrium price solution. Every core imputation in the original game constitutes a set of equilibrium prices. If there is no core the entrepreneurs can exploit the coalitions for a profit, i.e., they realize a positive rent for their organizing function. Application is made to determining fair wages to labor, and finding equilibrium prices for legislators selling their votes.
date: 1979
date_type: published
publisher: Physica-Verlag HD
id_number: 10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2
creators_browse_id: 2539
full_text_status: none
place_of_pub: Germany
pagerange: 32-38
refereed: TRUE
isbn: 978-3-662-41501-6
book_title: Applied Game Theory
editors_name: Brams, S.J.
editors_name: Schotter, A.
editors_name: Schwödiauer, G.
coversheets_dirty: FALSE
fp7_type: info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart
citation:   Young, H.P. <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/view/iiasa/2539.html>  (1979).  Exploitable Surplus in N-Person Games.    In:  Applied Game Theory. Eds. Brams, S.J., Schotter, A., & Schwödiauer, G., pp. 32-38 Germany: Physica-Verlag HD.  ISBN 978-3-662-41501-6 10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2 <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2>.