<mods:mods version="3.3" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-3.xsd" xmlns:mods="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"><mods:titleInfo><mods:title>Quotatone Apportionment Methods</mods:title></mods:titleInfo><mods:name type="personal"><mods:namePart type="given">M.L.</mods:namePart><mods:namePart type="family">Balinski</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:name type="personal"><mods:namePart type="given">H.P.</mods:namePart><mods:namePart type="family">Young</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:abstract>The problem of apportionment is that of allocating an integer number of seats “proportionally” among a set of states or regions as a fraction of their populations. An apportionment method satisfies quota if it accords to each state the exactly proportional (rational) number of seats due it rounded up or rounded down. A method is house monotone if no state’s allocation goes down when the total number of seats to be distributed goes up.&#13;
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This paper gives a simple characterization of all house monotone methods satisfying quota. Further, a manner of exposition is formulated which unites several key house monotone apportionment methods, thus showing clearly their connections.</mods:abstract><mods:originInfo><mods:dateIssued encoding="iso8601">1979-02</mods:dateIssued></mods:originInfo><mods:originInfo><mods:publisher>INFORMS</mods:publisher></mods:originInfo><mods:genre>Article</mods:genre></mods:mods>