<mets:mets OBJID="eprint_14094" LABEL="Eprints Item" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/METS/ http://www.loc.gov/standards/mets/mets.xsd http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-3.xsd" xmlns:mets="http://www.loc.gov/METS/" xmlns:mods="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"><mets:metsHdr CREATEDATE="2024-01-01T21:18:28Z"><mets:agent ROLE="CUSTODIAN" TYPE="ORGANIZATION"><mets:name>IIASA Repository</mets:name></mets:agent></mets:metsHdr><mets:dmdSec ID="DMD_eprint_14094_mods"><mets:mdWrap MDTYPE="MODS"><mets:xmlData><mods:titleInfo><mods:title>Matching and Resilience in Financial Networks</mods:title></mods:titleInfo><mods:name type="personal"><mods:namePart type="given">M.V.</mods:namePart><mods:namePart type="family">Leduc</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:name type="personal"><mods:namePart type="given">S.</mods:namePart><mods:namePart type="family">Thurner</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:abstract>When banks extend loans to each other, they generate a negative externality in the form of systemic risk. They create a network of interbank exposures by which they expose other banks to potential insolvency cascades. In this paper, we show how a regulator can use information ab out the financial network to devise a transaction-specific tax based on a network centrality measure that captures systemic importance. Since different transactions have different impact on creating systemic risk, they are taxed differently. We call this tax a Systemic Risk Tax (SRT). We show that this SRT induces a unique equilibrium matching of lenders and borrowers that is systemic-risk efficient, i.e. it minimizes systemic risk given a certain transaction volume. On the other hand, we show that without this SRT multiple equilibrium matchings can exist and are generally inefficient. This allows the regulator to effectively `rewire' the equilibrium interbank network so as to make it more resilient to insolvency cascades, without sacrificing transaction volume. Moreover, we show that a standard financial transaction tax (e.g. a Tobin-like tax) has no impact on reshaping the equilibrium financial network because it taxes all transactions indiscriminately. A Tobin-like tax is indeed shown to have a limited effect on reducing systemic risk while it decreases transaction volume.</mods:abstract><mods:originInfo><mods:dateIssued encoding="iso8601">2016-11</mods:dateIssued></mods:originInfo><mods:genre>Conference or Workshop Item</mods:genre></mets:xmlData></mets:mdWrap></mets:dmdSec><mets:amdSec ID="TMD_eprint_14094"><mets:rightsMD ID="rights_eprint_14094_mods"><mets:mdWrap MDTYPE="MODS"><mets:xmlData><mods:useAndReproduction>
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