?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&rft.relation=https%3A%2F%2Fpure.iiasa.ac.at%2Fid%2Feprint%2F4084%2F&rft.title=Behavioral+Equilibria+for+a+2x2+%22Seller-Buyer%22+Game+Evolutionary+Model&rft.creator=Kryazhimskiy%2C+A.V.&rft.description=Equilibric+behaviors+typical+for+differential+and+multi-step+games+are+defined+for+a+2+by+2+evolutionary+game+(two+populations+of+players%2C+two+strategies+for+each+player)+roughly+modeling+interactions+between+sellers+and+buyers.+It+is+shown+that+currently+optimal+behaviors+of+individuals+form+long-run+equilibric+dynamics+at+both+individual+and+population+levels.&rft.publisher=WP-94-131&rft.date=1994-12&rft.type=Monograph&rft.type=NonPeerReviewed&rft.format=text&rft.language=en&rft.identifier=https%3A%2F%2Fpure.iiasa.ac.at%2Fid%2Feprint%2F4084%2F1%2FWP-94-131.pdf&rft.identifier=++Kryazhimskiy%2C+A.V.+%3Chttps%3A%2F%2Fpure.iiasa.ac.at%2Fview%2Fiiasa%2F1393.html%3E++(1994).++Behavioral+Equilibria+for+a+2x2+%22Seller-Buyer%22+Game+Evolutionary+Model.+++IIASA+Working+Paper.+IIASA%2C+Laxenburg%2C+Austria%3A+WP-94-131+++++