<ctx:context-object xsi:schemaLocation="info:ofi/fmt:xml:xsd:ctx http://www.openurl.info/registry/docs/info:ofi/fmt:xml:xsd:ctx" timestamp="2021-08-27T17:14:44Z" xmlns:ctx="info:ofi/fmt:xml:xsd:ctx" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XML"><ctx:referent><ctx:identifier>info:oai:pure.iiasa.ac.at:4084</ctx:identifier><ctx:metadata-by-val><ctx:format>info:ofi/fmt:xml:xsd:oai_dc</ctx:format><ctx:metadata><oai_dc:dc xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
        <dc:relation>https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4084/</dc:relation>
        <dc:title>Behavioral Equilibria for a 2x2 "Seller-Buyer" Game Evolutionary Model</dc:title>
        <dc:creator>Kryazhimskiy, A.V.</dc:creator>
        <dc:description>Equilibric behaviors typical for differential and multi-step games are defined for a 2 by 2 evolutionary game (two populations of players, two strategies for each player) roughly modeling interactions between sellers and buyers. It is shown that currently optimal behaviors of individuals form long-run equilibric dynamics at both individual and population levels.</dc:description>
        <dc:publisher>WP-94-131</dc:publisher>
        <dc:date>1994-12</dc:date>
        <dc:type>Monograph</dc:type>
        <dc:type>NonPeerReviewed</dc:type>
        <dc:format>text</dc:format>
        <dc:language>en</dc:language>
        <dc:identifier>https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4084/1/WP-94-131.pdf</dc:identifier>
        <dc:identifier>  Kryazhimskiy, A.V. &lt;https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/view/iiasa/1393.html&gt;  (1994).  Behavioral Equilibria for a 2x2 "Seller-Buyer" Game Evolutionary Model.   IIASA Working Paper. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: WP-94-131     </dc:identifier></oai_dc:dc></ctx:metadata></ctx:metadata-by-val></ctx:referent></ctx:context-object>