TY  - RPRT
CY  - IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria
ID  - iiasa4084
UR  - https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4084/
A1  - Kryazhimskiy, A.V.
Y1  - 1994/12//
N2  - Equilibric behaviors typical for differential and multi-step games are defined for a 2 by 2 evolutionary game (two populations of players, two strategies for each player) roughly modeling interactions between sellers and buyers. It is shown that currently optimal behaviors of individuals form long-run equilibric dynamics at both individual and population levels.
PB  - WP-94-131
M1  - working_paper
TI  - Behavioral Equilibria for a 2x2 "Seller-Buyer" Game Evolutionary Model
AV  - public
EP  - 30
ER  -