eprintid: 4084 rev_number: 22 eprint_status: archive userid: 351 dir: disk0/00/00/40/84 datestamp: 2016-01-15 02:04:02 lastmod: 2021-08-27 17:14:44 status_changed: 2016-01-15 02:04:02 type: monograph metadata_visibility: show item_issues_count: 2 creators_name: Kryazhimskiy, A.V. creators_id: 1514 title: Behavioral Equilibria for a 2x2 "Seller-Buyer" Game Evolutionary Model ispublished: pub internal_subjects: iis_ecn internal_subjects: iis_met internal_subjects: iis_mod divisions: prog_dyn abstract: Equilibric behaviors typical for differential and multi-step games are defined for a 2 by 2 evolutionary game (two populations of players, two strategies for each player) roughly modeling interactions between sellers and buyers. It is shown that currently optimal behaviors of individuals form long-run equilibric dynamics at both individual and population levels. date: 1994-12 date_type: published publisher: WP-94-131 iiasapubid: WP-94-131 price: 10 creators_browse_id: 1393 full_text_status: public monograph_type: working_paper place_of_pub: IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria pages: 30 coversheets_dirty: FALSE fp7_type: info:eu-repo/semantics/book citation: Kryazhimskiy, A.V. (1994). Behavioral Equilibria for a 2x2 "Seller-Buyer" Game Evolutionary Model. IIASA Working Paper. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: WP-94-131 document_url: https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4084/1/WP-94-131.pdf