@techreport{iiasa4184,
           month = {April},
            type = {IIASA Working Paper},
           title = {Social Justice and Individual Choice},
         address = {IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria},
       publisher = {WP-94-025},
            year = {1994},
             url = {https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4184/},
        abstract = {Consider a divisible resource or cost that is to be fairly distributed among a group, and suppose that various members of the group have different opinions about what a fair distribution might be. We exhibit a class of mechanisms that aggregate individual opinions into a group opinion, and which have the property that no one can manipulate the size of his own share. There is a unique such mechanism that satisfies a variant of Arrow's conditions for social choice functions. We illustrate its application to distributing dues among the member countries of IIASA. Other potential applications include distributing shares in formerly state-owned enterprises, and in allocating voting power among different states or regions in a federal system of government.},
          author = {Young, H. P.}
}