info:oai:pure.iiasa.ac.at:4184info:ofi/fmt:xml:xsd:oai_dc https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4184/ Social Justice and Individual Choice Young, H.P. Consider a divisible resource or cost that is to be fairly distributed among a group, and suppose that various members of the group have different opinions about what a fair distribution might be. We exhibit a class of mechanisms that aggregate individual opinions into a group opinion, and which have the property that no one can manipulate the size of his own share. There is a unique such mechanism that satisfies a variant of Arrow's conditions for social choice functions. We illustrate its application to distributing dues among the member countries of IIASA. Other potential applications include distributing shares in formerly state-owned enterprises, and in allocating voting power among different states or regions in a federal system of government. WP-94-025 1994-04 Monograph NonPeerReviewed text en https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4184/1/WP-94-025.pdf Young, H.P. <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/view/iiasa/2539.html> (1994). Social Justice and Individual Choice. IIASA Working Paper. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: WP-94-025