%0 Report
%9 IIASA Working Paper
%A Young, H.P.
%C IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria
%D 1994
%F iiasa:4184
%T Social Justice and Individual Choice
%U https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4184/
%X Consider a divisible resource or cost that is to be fairly distributed among a group, and suppose that various members of the group have different opinions about what a fair distribution might be. We exhibit a class of mechanisms that aggregate individual opinions into a group opinion, and which have the property that no one can manipulate the size of his own share. There is a unique such mechanism that satisfies a variant of Arrow's conditions for social choice functions. We illustrate its application to distributing dues among the member countries of IIASA. Other potential applications include distributing shares in formerly state-owned enterprises, and in allocating voting power among different states or regions in a federal system of government.