TY  - RPRT
CY  - IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria
ID  - iiasa4184
UR  - https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4184/
A1  - Young, H.P.
Y1  - 1994/04//
N2  - Consider a divisible resource or cost that is to be fairly distributed among a group, and suppose that various members of the group have different opinions about what a fair distribution might be. We exhibit a class of mechanisms that aggregate individual opinions into a group opinion, and which have the property that no one can manipulate the size of his own share. There is a unique such mechanism that satisfies a variant of Arrow's conditions for social choice functions. We illustrate its application to distributing dues among the member countries of IIASA. Other potential applications include distributing shares in formerly state-owned enterprises, and in allocating voting power among different states or regions in a federal system of government.
PB  - WP-94-025
M1  - working_paper
TI  - Social Justice and Individual Choice
AV  - public
EP  - 20
ER  -