RT Monograph
SR 00
A1 Young, H.P.
T1 Social Justice and Individual Choice
YR 1994
FD 1994-04
SP 20
AB Consider a divisible resource or cost that is to be fairly distributed among a group, and suppose that various members of the group have different opinions about what a fair distribution might be. We exhibit a class of mechanisms that aggregate individual opinions into a group opinion, and which have the property that no one can manipulate the size of his own share. There is a unique such mechanism that satisfies a variant of Arrow's conditions for social choice functions. We illustrate its application to distributing dues among the member countries of IIASA. Other potential applications include distributing shares in formerly state-owned enterprises, and in allocating voting power among different states or regions in a federal system of government.
PB WP-94-025
PP IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria
AV Published
LK https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4184/