eprintid: 4184 rev_number: 21 eprint_status: archive userid: 351 dir: disk0/00/00/41/84 datestamp: 2016-01-15 02:04:41 lastmod: 2021-08-27 17:14:56 status_changed: 2016-01-15 02:04:41 type: monograph metadata_visibility: show item_issues_count: 2 creators_name: Young, H.P. creators_id: AL1397 title: Social Justice and Individual Choice ispublished: pub internal_subjects: iis_met internal_subjects: iis_neg divisions: prog_ins abstract: Consider a divisible resource or cost that is to be fairly distributed among a group, and suppose that various members of the group have different opinions about what a fair distribution might be. We exhibit a class of mechanisms that aggregate individual opinions into a group opinion, and which have the property that no one can manipulate the size of his own share. There is a unique such mechanism that satisfies a variant of Arrow's conditions for social choice functions. We illustrate its application to distributing dues among the member countries of IIASA. Other potential applications include distributing shares in formerly state-owned enterprises, and in allocating voting power among different states or regions in a federal system of government. date: 1994-04 date_type: published publisher: WP-94-025 iiasapubid: WP-94-025 price: 10 creators_browse_id: 2539 full_text_status: public monograph_type: working_paper place_of_pub: IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria pages: 20 coversheets_dirty: FALSE fp7_type: info:eu-repo/semantics/book citation: Young, H.P. (1994). Social Justice and Individual Choice. IIASA Working Paper. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: WP-94-025 document_url: https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4184/1/WP-94-025.pdf