RT Journal Article
SR 00
ID 10.1006/game.1995.1054
A1 Kaniovski, Y.M.
A1 Young, H.P.
T1 Learning dynamics in games with stochastic perturbations
JF Games and Economic Behavior
YR 1995
FD 1995-11
VO 11
IS 2
SP 330
OP 363
AB Consider a generalization of fictitious play in which agents′ choices are perturbed by incomplete information about what the other side has done, variability in their payoffs, and unexplained trembles. These perturbed best reply dynamics define a nonstationary Markov process on an infinite state space. It is shown, using results from stochastic approximation theory, that for 2 × 2 games it converges almost surely to a point that lies close to a stable Nash equilibrium, whether pure or mixed. This generalizes a result of Fudenherg and Kreps, who demonstrate convergence when the game has a unique mixed equilibrium.
PB Elsevier
SN 0899-8256
LK https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4243/