TY  - JOUR
ID  - iiasa4316
UR  - https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4316/
IS  - 2
A1  - Sigmund, K.
A1  - Nowak, M.A.
Y1  - 1995/11//
N2  - Computer simulations have shown that mutation-selection processes frequently lead to the establishment of cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. To simplify the mathematical analysis, it has usually been assumed that the interaction is repeated infinitely often. Here, we consider the finitely repeated case. Using renewal equations, we derive analytic results on the adaptive dynamics of monomorphic populations evolving in trait-space, describe the cooperation-rewarding zone and specify when unconditional defectors can invade. Tit for tat plays an essential, but transient, role in the evolution of cooperation. A large part of the paper considers the case when players make their moves not simultaneously, but alternatingly.
PB  - Elsevier
JF  - Games and Economic Behavior
VL  - 11
SN  - 1090-2473
TI  - Invasion dynamics of the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
SP  - 364
AV  - none
EP  - 390
ER  -