RT Journal Article
SR 00
ID 10.1006/game.1995.1055
A1 Sigmund, K.
A1 Nowak, M.A.
T1 Invasion dynamics of the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
JF Games and Economic Behavior
YR 1995
FD 1995-11
VO 11
IS 2
SP 364
OP 390
AB Computer simulations have shown that mutation-selection processes frequently lead to the establishment of cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. To simplify the mathematical analysis, it has usually been assumed that the interaction is repeated infinitely often. Here, we consider the finitely repeated case. Using renewal equations, we derive analytic results on the adaptive dynamics of monomorphic populations evolving in trait-space, describe the cooperation-rewarding zone and specify when unconditional defectors can invade. Tit for tat plays an essential, but transient, role in the evolution of cooperation. A large part of the paper considers the case when players make their moves not simultaneously, but alternatingly.
PB Elsevier
SN 1090-2473
LK https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4316/