eprintid: 4316 rev_number: 6 eprint_status: archive userid: 351 dir: disk0/00/00/43/16 datestamp: 2016-01-15 02:05:24 lastmod: 2021-08-27 17:35:59 status_changed: 2016-01-15 02:05:24 type: article metadata_visibility: show item_issues_count: 1 creators_name: Sigmund, K. creators_name: Nowak, M.A. creators_id: 1050 creators_id: 7540 title: Invasion dynamics of the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game ispublished: pub internal_subjects: iis_ecl internal_subjects: iis_met internal_subjects: iis_mod divisions: prog_adn abstract: Computer simulations have shown that mutation-selection processes frequently lead to the establishment of cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. To simplify the mathematical analysis, it has usually been assumed that the interaction is repeated infinitely often. Here, we consider the finitely repeated case. Using renewal equations, we derive analytic results on the adaptive dynamics of monomorphic populations evolving in trait-space, describe the cooperation-rewarding zone and specify when unconditional defectors can invade. Tit for tat plays an essential, but transient, role in the evolution of cooperation. A large part of the paper considers the case when players make their moves not simultaneously, but alternatingly. date: 1995-11 date_type: published publisher: Elsevier id_number: 10.1006/game.1995.1055 iiasapubid: XJ-95-017 iiasa_bibref: Games and Economic Behavior; 11(2):364-390 (November 1995) iiasa_bibnotes: [doi:10.1006/game.1995.1055]. Special Issue article creators_browse_id: 282 creators_browse_id: 1481 full_text_status: none publication: Games and Economic Behavior volume: 11 number: 2 pagerange: 364-390 refereed: TRUE issn: 1090-2473 coversheets_dirty: FALSE fp7_type: info:eu-repo/semantics/article citation: Sigmund, K. & Nowak, M.A. (1995). Invasion dynamics of the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. Games and Economic Behavior 11 (2) 364-390. 10.1006/game.1995.1055 .