relation: https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4604/
title: Verifying the absence of undeclared activities
creator: Canty, M.
creator: Avenhaus, R.
description: The resource distribution problem posed to arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation regimes by the extension of the rights of inspectorates to look for undeclared, illegal activities is analyzed in terms of noncooperative game theory. A general solution for the inspection of locations within a State subject to verification is derived, which relates quantitative, optimal inspection probabilities to a subjective assessment of the importance of the locations.
publisher: Institute of Nuclear Materials Management
date: 1996
type: Article
type: PeerReviewed
identifier:   Canty, M. & Avenhaus, R. <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/view/iiasa/1699.html>  (1996).  Verifying the absence of undeclared activities.   Journal of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 36-43.