https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4604 2021-08-27T17:15:25Z info:eu-repo/semantics/descriptiveMetadata https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4604/ Verifying the absence of undeclared activities Canty, M. Avenhaus, R. The resource distribution problem posed to arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation regimes by the extension of the rights of inspectorates to look for undeclared, illegal activities is analyzed in terms of noncooperative game theory. A general solution for the inspection of locations within a State subject to verification is derived, which relates quantitative, optimal inspection probabilities to a subjective assessment of the importance of the locations. Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 1996 Article PeerReviewed Canty, M. & Avenhaus, R. <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/view/iiasa/1699.html> (1996). Verifying the absence of undeclared activities. Journal of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 36-43. info:eu-repo/semantics/humanStartPage