RT Journal Article
SR 00
A1 Canty, M.
A1 Avenhaus, R.
T1 Verifying the absence of undeclared activities
JF Journal of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management
YR 1996
FD 1996
SP 36
OP 43
AB The resource distribution problem posed to arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation regimes by the extension of the rights of inspectorates to look for undeclared, illegal activities is analyzed in terms of noncooperative game theory. A general solution for the inspection of locations within a State subject to verification is derived, which relates quantitative, optimal inspection probabilities to a subjective assessment of the importance of the locations.
PB Institute of Nuclear Materials Management
SN 0893-6188
LK https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4604/