eprintid: 4604
rev_number: 6
eprint_status: archive
userid: 351
dir: disk0/00/00/46/04
datestamp: 2016-01-15 02:06:38
lastmod: 2021-08-27 17:15:25
status_changed: 2016-01-15 02:06:38
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
item_issues_count: 2
creators_name: Canty, M.
creators_name: Avenhaus, R.
creators_id: AL0013
title: Verifying the absence of undeclared activities
ispublished: pub
internal_subjects: iis_nuc
divisions: prog_pin
abstract: The resource distribution problem posed to arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation regimes by the extension of the rights of inspectorates to look for undeclared, illegal activities is analyzed in terms of noncooperative game theory. A general solution for the inspection of locations within a State subject to verification is derived, which relates quantitative, optimal inspection probabilities to a subjective assessment of the importance of the locations.
date: 1996
date_type: published
publisher: Institute of Nuclear Materials Management
iiasapubid: XJ-96-104
iiasa_bibref: Journal of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management; XXV(1):36-43 [1996]
creators_browse_id: 1699
full_text_status: none
publication: Journal of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management
pagerange: 36-43
refereed: TRUE
issn: 0893-6188
coversheets_dirty: FALSE
fp7_type: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
citation:   Canty, M. & Avenhaus, R. <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/view/iiasa/1699.html>  (1996).  Verifying the absence of undeclared activities.   Journal of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 36-43.