@techreport{iiasa4987,
           month = {April},
            type = {IIASA Working Paper},
           title = {Central Paths and Selection of Equilibria},
         address = {IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria},
       publisher = {WP-96-039},
            year = {1996},
             url = {https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4987/},
        abstract = {For two populations of players playing repeatedly a same bimatrix game, a dynamics associated with the method of analytic centers for linear programming is described. All populations' evolutions converge to static equilibria. All evolutions starting in a same connected set converge to a same equilibrium. If a starting time is sufficiently large, "almost all" evolutions end up at a single equilibrium representing all populations' pure strategy groups (phenotypes) with nonzero proportions. The dynamics is interpreted as populations' rule to learn best replying.},
          author = {Kryazhimskiy, A. V. and Sonnevend, G.}
}