"4987","22","archive","351",,,"disk0/00/00/49/87","2016-01-15 02:08:06","2021-08-27 17:15:48","2016-01-15 02:08:06","monograph",,,"show","","","2",,,"Kryazhimskiy","A.V.","","","1514","","",,,,,"","","Central Paths and Selection of Equilibria","pub","","iis_met","prog_dyn",,,"For two populations of players playing repeatedly a same bimatrix game, a dynamics associated with the method of analytic centers for linear programming is described. All populations' evolutions converge to static equilibria. All evolutions starting in a same connected set converge to a same equilibrium. If a starting time is sufficiently large, ""almost all"" evolutions end up at a single equilibrium representing all populations' pure strategy groups (phenotypes) with nonzero proportions. The dynamics is interpreted as populations' rule to learn best replying.","1996-04","published","WP-96-039",,,,,,,"",,,,,"",,,,,"",,,,,"","",,"","WP-96-039",,,"10",,,"1393","public","working_paper",,,,,,"IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria",,"23",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"","","","",,"","",,,,,,,"",,,,,"FALSE",,,"info:eu-repo/semantics/book",
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